نقد دیدگاه معاصرین در حل شبهه تعارض میان «مشهوری» بودن و «عقلی» بودن گزاره‌های اخلاقی در نگاه ابن سینا

A Critical Study of the Contemporary Approaches to the Contradiction of Avicenna's View Concerning the Moral Judgments

Seyyed Ali Alamolhoda

Associate Professor of Payam Noor University, E-mail: alamolhoda@pnu.ac.ir

Abstract

One of the most famous criticisms for Avicenna's criticizers is about his opinion for the general acceptance of ethical propositions. On the other hand, he emphasizes that they are intelligible. They say that if they are generally accepted by persons, so they will be relative and conventional. But based on the principle of peripatetic philosophy his opinion will be a self-contradiction. Some contemporary Muslim thinkers emphasis that general acceptance of them in his view has belonged to the logical status of them. And the intelligibility of them has belonged to the epistemological position of them. But in this essay, it will be shown that the epistemological situation of the ethical proposition has a necessary relation to the logical position of them. On the other hand, if they will be intelligible so they can't be relativistic, but they were achieved from the social convention. So the sharp conflict could be recognized in Avicenna's ethical opinions.

Keywords: Avicenna, General acceptance, intelligible, proposition, ethics

1-Introduction

Avicenna in most of his works emphasizes that the source of understanding the ethical propositions is the functional intellect. But he does not offer any homogeneous understanding of the functional intellect. Also, we can become sure that he means functional intellect, like conceptual intellect, understands the ethical propositions by using the demonstrative methods.

But on the other hand, he has considered this kind of propositions as the conventionals that had been accepted just basis on their renown. And he so has called the” Area Mahmoodeh” or”taadibat salaries”. According he has explained that the source of their acceptance necessarily must be their fame among society and not any other fact. Thirdly, in “Rasael” and “Mantegh al Mashreghieen” he has announced that the source of understanding of moral judgments is the Divine Commands. So we can see a deep astonishment of his view about the essence and the structure of ethical propositions. So many criticizers of Avicennian philosophy have indicted him to self-contradiction about the moral propositions.

On the other hand, Avicennian contemporary thinkers have tried to solve this problem by separating the thresholds in a moral proposition. They emphasis on the epistemological and semantical and ontological scopes in these judgments. Particularly, they want to say when Avicenna has explained that these judgments have been just accepted basis on their social fame, he has considered just the semantical threshold of these propositions. And when he has announced that the source of understanding of this kind of judgments is the functional intellect, He has considered the ontological and epistemological scope of them. So they have concluded that there is not any contradiction in Avicenna's moral viewpoints.

2-Discussion and Results

Lahigi believes that Mutazilism and Shiism and Muslim peripatetics had accepted the essential Goodness and Badness. This means that they believe the quality of the relationship between the predicate and subject in moral judgments, is the essential necessity. So the predicate in these propositions must be a natural accident of the subject. So when we accept the Muslim Aristotelian have recognized the essential Goodness and Badness, basically it means Avicenna has to accept this opinion.

On the other hand, the Muslim peripatetics have put forward rational Goodness and Badness. Based on this Aristotelian opinion, they believe that moral proposition has this capacity to have been deduced from a deduction. So it means that ethical judgments include certain theoretical foundations. So the quality of judgment in them is an essential necessity. So from the viewpoint of Aristotelian philosophers like Avicenna, the moral propositions have the dere necessity and dedicto necessity. Also on the other hand, as it has been shown, Avicenna in many of his works has recognized moral predicates as a social value or as a Divine value that has been rooted from Divine command or the social acceptance. So as we mentioned we could see an implicit contradiction in Avicenna's opinion about the nature and structure of ethical judgments.

But some contemporary thinkers like dr. Javadi and dr.masoodi have offered a plan for rejecting this critique to Avicenna's ethical viewpoint. They emphasize on the different thresholds in the ethical judgments. They consider the semantic scope of these propositions a social fact. But the ontological scope or epistemological scope of them is rational and necessary.

But in this research, we want to show this contemporary solution can’t be suitable. Because we accept the differences between these thresholds. But they have a consequential relation to each other. We can explain this fact by focusing on the relation between dere necessity and dedicto necessity. When we accept the relation between a predicate and its subject, it is the dere necessity. We mean this predicate can’t be separated from its subject in any possible universe. And On the other hand, we consider a judgment as a necessary truth. So it must be logically accepted that judgment includes a dere necessary relation between its predicate and its subject, but it isn’t true necessarily. Or we can’t accept a proposition to be true necessarily, but there is no dere necessary relation between its predicate and its subject. So it becomes clear also that the dere and dedicto necessity are distinct. But they are back and belly.

According to what we have mentioned, we conclude that the epistemic and ontological threshold of moral judgment has a consequent relation to the semantic scope of these judgments.

3-Conclusion

In spite of the difference between the moral judgment thresholds that have been emphasized by some contemporary scholars, we can see a logical dependence among them. So moral propositions cannot be recognized on the basis of their semantic thresholds. And otherwise they have been considered rational judgments that include a natural necessary relation between their predicates and their subjects. And the differences between the scopes of moral propositions cannot be a proper solution to denying Avicenna's moral contradiction in viewpoints.

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