اندیشۀ اخلاقی ابن سینا

Although we have a promise from Avicenna (Ibn Sina) ( in his Shefa (Elahiat, 1405,p.11)) of writing a treatise on ethics, actually he did not write it, or it has not reached us; and we have not any independent treatise from him on practical wisdom. However, two concluding chapters of Shefa (Elahiat) would show his points of view on the origin of the judgment of practical reason, on ethics, and on practical philosophy as a whole. Moreover, in two other places, he has discussions on ethics: in the investigations (1) on the faculties of the soul, and (2) on the materials and promises of the syllogistic. He has a brief discussion of the faculty of practical reason and its function in (1), and some other-where told practical tips in (2). All this makes his saying on ethics somehow wage, and occasionally, at least apparently, inconsistent. So, it is necessary for us to take some light from his thoughts on other matters in order to understand his occasionally unarticulated views on ethics; although it is most important not to confuse the two separate domains of theory and practice. As a clear and leading example, we must not apply two theoretical concepts of demonstrability and truth onto practical issues.

This paper has two parts: at first, we discuss practical reason, its function, and the indemonstrability of ethical judgments (ara'e mahmude); then we show that truth and falsity do not apply to these judgments.

According to Avicenna, our practical reason does not reach to universal famous judgments as "lying in bad" by way of argumentation and demonstration, but it is not the case that these judgments are self-evident for this reason. Although he does say that this kind of propositions is different from pure self-evident propositions, he accepts by some qualifications, that these two can become rational ones if we provide some proofs for them. However, he, himself, not only gives no proof for such famous promises, and shows no way for this, but also sees the foundations of such proofs for practical "oughts" and "not-oughts", i.e. the so-called empirical promises, are not "empirical" in the strict sense of the word, but come from weak and illusionary experiments (Avicenna, 1404h, pp. 184-5).

For Avicenna, the two fundamental ethical concepts of "good" and "bad", come for us from observations about social affairs and from repeated educations concerning doing or not-doing some deeds. And it is this repetition that makes us think that we innately distinguish good and/or bad deeds (ibid, p.183).

Ethical judgments for Avicenna are famous ones (Mashhourat) and judgments, as such, are not innate ones (Avicenna, 1364h, p.119): that is to say, if we were not born in a polis and were not received practical educations, we did not see them as certain and indubitable judgments; they would be dubitable ones. Any judgment which is dubitable, for this very reason, is not an innate one (ibid. p.117). So, human reason, alone and by itself, does not recognize the ethical judgments.

These so-called famous judgments, however, are so deeply rooted in our souls that every one of us thinks that heshe innately understands that e.g. "justice is good" or "injustice is bad". What is the reason for this (where come these judgments and what is the cause of their deep-rootedness)? Avicenna's answer is in his Nejat (1364h, p.117 ): these come from polis and political life, i.e. from habit, education, accidental social contracts, inherited traditions, inductions about what is or is not beneficial for us, necessities of practical life, and so on. Thus, these judgments are neither innate nor independently and empirically come from the outside world and correspond to nothing in it; so, they are outside of the domain of "truth and facility". 

References

-      Aristotle (1934) Nicomachean Ethics, trans. H. Rackham, Loeb Classical Library, London.

-      Ghavam Safari, Mehdi (2009) How metaphysics is possible, Organization for Research in Islamic Culture and Thought, Second Edition, Tehran.

-      Ibn Sina (1404) Al-Shafa'a, al-Ta'biyyat, al-Nafs, ed. Church al-Qawnati and Sa'id Zayed, published by Ayatollah al-Azimi al-Marashi al-Najafi's school booklet, Qom.

-      Ibn Sina (1405) Al-Shifa, al-Mantiq, al-Makhdul, ed. al-Qawati al-Rabih and Mahmoud al-Khaziri and Fuad al-Huwani research, published by Ayatollah al-Azimi al-Marashi al-Najafi's school booklet,, Qom.

-      Ibn Tofail (1982) Hayyi-ibn-Yakttan, Badiez-Zaman Forouzanfar's, Persian Translation, Book Publishing, Tehran.