Heidegger’s Socrates: 
“Pure Thinking” on Method, Truth, and Learning

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Abstract

This speculative essay develops a unique understanding of Socrates by reading Heidegger in relation to contemporary Platonic scholarship arising from the Continental tradition, which embraces Plato’s Socrates as a non-doctrinal philosopher. The portrait of Heidegger’s Socrates that emerges is related to contemporary education and its drive toward emphasizing an academic focus on Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math (STEM) at the exclusion of the Liberal Arts, with the goal of showing that other forms of “knowledge,” such as the philosophical “truth” emerging from the relationship between the human and the unfolding of Being, while stifled or neglected in STEM curricula, are also crucial to our continued development as human beings. Ultimately, the essay seeks to draw out an authentic vision of paideia by turning to the valuable, albeit limited, writings of Heidegger focused specifically on the historical philosopher Socrates, as opposed to Plato.

Key words: Heidegger Studies; Non-Doctrinal Socrates; Phenomenology and Platonic Studies; Paideia and education; Contemporary Educational Practices.

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Introduction
This essay elucidates a view of “Heidegger’s Socrates” with the understanding that Socrates is a highly enigmatic figure in the Heideggerian corpus. We are also interested in the way Heidegger classified Plato as a “doctrinal” thinker, for it is the case that Heidegger had far more to say about Plato than he did about Socrates. In what follows, we attempt to sketch a portrait of Socrates - as a decidedly “non-doctrinal” philosopher or thinker - from an understanding of Heidegger’s philosophy in a way that might be related to a unique vision of education (paideia) as a philosophical way-of-Being, or perhaps and more appropriately, given Heidegger’s explicit and unwavering task during the “Turn,” reveal a mode of “pure thinking” in the relationship with the truth-of-Being, which is at once an originary educative event. Ultimately, turning to a view of Heidegger’s Socrates, we offer a counter view to such common educational issues as the employment of methods, the means of knowledge acquisition, and the understanding of the learning process as they comprise the educational experience in the age of standardization and the rise and dominance of STEM curricula.

The chapter unfolds in three sections: (1) We explore Heidegger’s “doctrinal” view of Plato and discuss how this view influences education; (2) We offer a detailed analysis of pure thinking, truth, and dialectic method in relation to “Heidegger’s Socrates,” which includes insights on how this view might be clarified and enhanced by turning to “non-doctrinal” interpretation of Plato’s Socrates emerging from recent scholarship focused on re-readings of the Platonic corpus; and (3) We synthesizing the foregoing analyses with a view of education (paideia), attempting to elucidate a unique vision of a Socratic education in the spirit of Heidegger’s reading, which lives beyond the understanding of philosophy as akin to a science and education as understood as a standardized, controllable, and predictable technological achievement. In relation to (2), we adopt this unique approach, which includes works that are not explicitly Heideggerian in theme or content, because of the lack of detailed material written by Heidegger about Socrates. The incorporation of Continental Platonic scholarship contributes to demonstrating how the key ideas emerging from Heidegger’s reading of Socrates might be understood when further elucidated by incorporating similar scholarship embracing Socrates, as does Heidegger, as a radically “non-doctrinal” thinker.

Heidegger’s “Doctrinal” Plato
Truth as “Correctness” in Relation to Education
Heidegger is criticized in Continental “phenomenological” scholarship and “hermeneutic” readings of Plato for developing and espousing a “doctrinal” view of Plato’s philosophy (Hyland 1995, 2004; Zuckert 1998). We also encounter this critique in “Third Way” Platonist scholarship, e.g., Gonzalez states emphatically that the “figure who normally bears the name ‘Plato’ in Heidegger’s text is a dogmatic metaphysician,” and we add, the first systematic metaphysician and, as related directly to our concern, “the complete antithesis to the figure Heidegger himself names ‘Socrates’.” (Gonzalez 2009: 431). Against Heidegger, Hyland offers a decidedly “non-doctrinal” reading of Plato, stating, “Heidegger’s reading of the cave analogy in Plato’s Doctrine of Truth is
We pause here briefly to examine the term “doctrinal” in relation to Platonic scholarship in order to highlight characteristics consistent with “doctrinal” readings emerging from the analytic tradition, e.g., Sahakian and Sahakian (1976), who read Plato as a systematic metaphysical idealist: (1) Knowledge “produced” by the dialectic is propositional in nature; (2) The dialectic, as method *sine qua non* of the philosopher-rulers, culminates in *noesis* by transcending the *hypothetical method* in the production of certain truth; (3) Knowledge accruing via the dialectic is of the essential “Forms” and the “Idea” of the Good; and (4) The “positive” experience of the dialectic, which is equated with “Socratic” education, is substantive, definitive, and reproducible. Thus, already, in relation to our concern with method, truth, and learning we encounter views that are opposed to a “non-doctrinal” or “non-systematic” interpretation Plato and Plato’s Socrates. Contrarily, Heidegger’s decidedly “non-doctrinal” view of Socrates Heidegger embraces the following positions: (1) Knowledge or truth of virtue is non-propositional in nature; (2) Knowledge of the virtues cannot be taught via transmission, and is rather lived and instantiated within the unfolding context of the *elenchus*-dialectic; (3) The dialectic, unlike the “scientific method,” is neither transposable nor does it terminate in the production of definite results; and (4) The relation to “truth” the dialectic establishes is always limited because of the ontological distance separating the human off from the full revelation of the *esse* of virtue, this because of the *existential* limits imposed by finitude.

In one of Heidegger’s most notable readings of Plato, the *Allegory of the Cave* serves to elucidate and establish Plato’s understanding of the essence of truth (*aletheia*) with the concomitant understanding of how the essence of truth ultimately determines an authentic view of education as *paideia*. Authentic education (*paideia*), for Heidegger, in his reading of Plato and the *Allegory* is represented in a series of “movements” as the turning around (*periagoge*) of the entire soul back to itself enlightened, i.e., an authentic education - the very form of education the “doctrinal” Plato fails to realize because of his initial misunderstanding of the essence of truth - according to Heidegger, “lays hold of the soul itself and transforms it in its entirety by first leading us to the place of essential Being accustoming us to it” (Heidegger 1998, 165). The theme of “light” permeates the reading of the *Allegory* and it is within that which “shines” forth, is “seen,” that the “whatness” of things manifests, and so it is in *quidditas*, and not *existentia*, that *esse* as *essentia* is located. The “whatness” of a thing is traced directly to a “view of what is present” (Heidegger 1998: 173), and for Plato this represents the essence of all things, the “whatness” of a thing indicates that it can be seen and hence known (*idea*/idein) in its unhiddenness, in its ability to *shine forth*. According to Heidegger, in Plato, “Unhiddenness” now means: the unhidden always as what is accessible thanks to the idea’s ability to shine,” and this is what “brings about presencing, specifically the coming to presence of what a being is in any given instance,” and so, as Heidegger critically concludes, seeing - as unhiddenness itself - “is yoked into a ‘relation’ with seeing, it becomes ‘relative’ to seeing (Heidegger 1998: 173).
Plato thus fails to trace the essence of truth to primordial hiddenness and finitude, and rather to the “secondary” and “dependent” occurrence of unhiddenness itself, to what is present, to the thing that is shown and stands before us and remains “in its constancy” (Heidegger 1998, 175), in its naked givenness, i.e., the very thing given through “unhiddenness” in the event of Being. Heidegger’s concern is far more originary, as Sheehan articulates, for it is the ontological concern with the underlying phenomenon that makes “givenness” possible in the first instance, i.e., what is it that facilitates or “produces (poiei sein) givenness” and “provisionally and heuristically we may designate this focal issue as ‘the enabling power’ that makes possible the correlation of givenness/being as its dative” (Sheehan 2001: 7), and as stated above, this is Heidegger’s concern with primordial “hiddenness” (in Being’s recession) as the essence of truth. Importantly, this has implications for Plato’s conception of aletheia, which is erroneously “taken as the opposite of ἐλεθεια (i.e., of the false sense of the incorrect)” (Heidegger 1998: 178), and is reduced to and embraced as “correctness” (ὁρθότης), and this indicates that truth informs and grounds our comportment to (present-at-hand) beings and not to Being. The essence of truth, which becomes an epistemological and not an ontological issue, is taken as the “agreement” or relation between idea and thing as expressed through a locution or proposition, where the locus of truth is encountered, e.g., as in the history of Western philosophy and the understanding of adequatio intellectus et rei (“agreement between intellect (idea) and thing”), expressed through the Correspondence Model of Truth, and herein lies the initial ground for a Platonic reading that might be labeled “doctrinal.” Due to this misinterpretation of aletheia, Plato’s vision of knowing and learning, or “education,” is represented by gignoschein - and not authentically as paideia - the process of “knowing by way of seeing,” and this is linked by Heidegger with the Greek ἴδειν in relation to idea in terms of homoiōsis as the overall “agreement of the act of knowing with the thing itself” as seen (Heidegger 1998: 177).4

As stated, Heidegger claims that the idea of truth is inseparable from education, and if we follow this logic, we understand that since the “first beginning” education moves away from an original notion of paideia as it is instantiated within the soul’s relation to the truth of Being, shifts from an open manner of questioning grounded in finitude, mystery, and primordial hiddenness, and is instead systematically “harnessed in a relation to looking, apprehending, thinking, and asserting” (Heidegger 1998: 182). This leads to a view of education that is directed toward the accumulation and possession of knowledge, indeed, as Heidegger points out, if receiving a so-called “good education,” we would then “know everything possible to know in all realms of science, art, and the like,” and we would continue to “acquire each day what is newest and most valuable” (Heidegger, 1993: 258). This is a view of education that we equate with contemporary education, resulting from the fallout of Platonism, a form of education that Scott, in his reading of Socrates’ “non-doctrinal” practice of education, claims is akin to an additive model of education, which is the very type of education - the filling up of empty vessels, the piling and building up of knowledge - that Plato’s Socrates continually decries in the
Heidegger's Socrates

dialogues, as opposed to an integrative model of education, which he associates with an original form of paideia. In relation to these thoughts, Heidegger observes that when “thinking” in education is conceived as a “technique for explaining highest causes,” it comes to an “end by slipping out of its element,” it then procures its “validity as techne, as an instrument of education and therefore as a classroom matter,” in terms of standardization, and as such this presupposes it is already a “cultural concern” (Heidegger 1993: 221).

Indeed, according to Heidegger, language itself moves in the direction of the “service of expediting communication along routes where objectification - the uniform accessibility of everything to everyone - branches out and disregards all limits” (Heidegger 1993: 221), and when this occurs, beings (and Being) shows up as “actualities in a calculative” schema, i.e., “scientifically and by way of philosophy, with explanations and proofs,” and so we believe that we wipe away or outstrip the inherent mystery in things, and have already “decided the truth of Being” as established by means of “causes and explanatory grounds.” (Heidegger 1993: 223). This “cultural concern” or phenomenon that Heidegger references in is traceable to the oppressive “en-framing” effect of das Ge-stell (Heidegger 1977). Here we note that it is because of Plato’s “doctrine of truth” that the essence of technology manifests in the modern epoch, for according to Heidegger, “Plato’s doctrine of ‘truth’ is not something past, it is historically ‘present,’ not just in the sense of his teaching have a ‘later effect,’” but rather in the sense that the change to the essence of truth leaves us with “an all-dominating fundamental reality, long established and thus still in place” (Heidegger 1998: 181-182). Drawing on Heidegger’s interpretation, we note that we today in education encounter a technological-and-quantitative view of the three educational issues of our concern: (1) Method is understood as a top-down, transposable schema for “problem-solving” (scientific method) or “teaching”; (2) Truth is conceived (and experienced) as the destination to which method inevitably leads, i.e., knowledge as something that is acquired, possessed, and validated by one or another epistemological model (e.g., Correspondence Model of Truth); and (3) Learning is a controllable, predictable, and terminal activity that occurs through the successful “application” of a given method, indicating that “truth” has been procured, which is then assessed to indicate the student’s or learner’s educational “achievement.”

Heidegger’s “Non-Doctrinal” Socrates

“Pure” Thinking in the “Sway” of the Unfolding of Essential Truth

Heidegger identifies Socrates as the “purest thinker of the West” (Heidegger 1968: 17), and it is this classification as a “pure thinker” that we are committed to unpacking as it relates to Socrates’ understanding and practice of his dialectic method, his view of “truth,” and his understanding of philosophy (or thinking) as a process of original learning (paideia). Socrates, in his ever-renewed quest for truth, observes Heidegger, is courageously “drawn to what withdraws,” and when this happens to a thinker in the process of authentically thinking, he is drawn into “the enigmatic and therefore mutable nearness of its appeal,” despite being “far away from what withdraws” and even though “the withdrawal may remain as veiled as ever” (Heidegger 1968, 17). This, as we
explain constitutes or instantiates for Heidegger the “living context” of thinking, a context facilitating the “draft” of the dynamic counter-striving of lighting and concealing, and Socrates, according to Heidegger, did “nothing else than place himself into this draft, this current, and maintain himself in it,” and this is why, according to Heidegger he was the purest thinker of the West (Heidegger 1968: 17). To bring clarity to this notion of thinking in terms of an immersion in the “draft,” we turn to Heidegger’s understanding and interpretation of what he terms Da-sein’s Being-historical thinking (inceptive/mindful thinking), which is an original way of doing philosophy, or thinking, “according to a more originary basic stance” within the context sheltering the unfolding of “the question of the truth of be-ing,” which is no longer a “thinking about something and representing something objective” (Heidegger 1999: 3), but rather a thinking of matters in the poietic manner of bringing forth what is thought in its incompleteness while at once retaining and sheltering traces and intimations of its supreme and primordial power, which inspires the respect for the ineffability of that which is thought and its refusal to be brought to full disclosure or rendered wholly intelligible in language.

For Heidegger, as we know, it is Being qua Being or the essential truth of Being that is thought, while for Socrates it is ultimately the Being or ineffable and mysterious essence of the virtues, which he continually questions within the context of his thought and “examination” (exetazein). Heidegger claims that inceptive-mindful thinking is attuned to the matter at hand, original questioning, and thinking itself, in order to authentically hold the thinker in the essential “sway” of the relationship between thinking and the essential truth of Being. This type of thinking does not come to an end, for it is never a means to the end of “truth” that might terminate the thinking and is always actively underway as it is grounded in recession or primordial hiddenness and so it experiences and thinks the coming-to-be and passing-away of Being, it breaks open and holds open what is most question-worthy and so abides amid Being’s essential unfolding. There is an exigent, distressing need, Heidegger claims, of “holding oneself within the essential sway of truth” (Heidegger 1999: 258). This form of thinking shelters the mystery, or Being’s recession into hiddenness (Entrückung) that initially facilitates unhiddleness (Berückung), illuminating beings in such a way that self-hiddenness and the event and truth of Being unfolds in its most primordial way. This is one way to interpret Heidegger’s comments regarding Socrates’ pure mode of thinking, and in the phenomenological “non-doctrinal” readings of Plato’s Socrates, this is also how we might understand the questioning-context sheltering and instantiating the unfolding of Socrates’ mode or practice of questioning, his mode of elenchus-dialectic examination.

Heidegger claims that Socrates thinks a single thought, for he repeatedly thinks “on no other topic than what things are” and continues to say “the same thing about the same thing” (Heidegger 1956: 74) and, as stated, this for Socrates is the Being of the virtues. He thinks the same thing because the matter demands the unwavering dedication to continually return to it, responding to its enigmatic withdrawal and appeal, because its very essence resists being exhausted by the questioning, and this is because what Socrates inquires into
remains question-worthy. To think such thoughts we must first, states Heidegger, “incline toward what addresses itself to thought – and that is that which of itself gives food for thought,” this he identifies as a gift, and the “gift of what must be properly be thought about, is what we call most thought-provoking” (Heidegger 1968: 17) – which is most question-worthy. This we relate directly to the “the question” Socrates asks, which finds its origin (arche) in an attunement or pathos Heidegger calls “astonishment” (das Erstaunen) that is related to “wonder” (to thaumazein), and as Socrates explains in the Theaetetus, this attunement grounds philosophy. When talking of the “beginning,” Heidegger references arche, which “names that from which something proceeds,” however, this “from where’ is not left behind in the process of going out, but the beginning rather becomes that which the verb achein expresses, that which governs” (Heidegger 1959: 81), i.e., astonishment and wonder give birth to and continue to nourish, invigorate, and direct Socrates’ ever-renewed philosophical inquiry. In and through “wonder” we are set within a relationship to what is inquired into, and here recall our initial comments regarding Socrates and the “draft” of thinking, wherein that which is questioned, that which is essential, “retreats” from our advances, as we are held in a state of “wonder,” and are simultaneously “forcibly drawn to and, as it were, held fast by from which it retreats” (Heidegger 1959: 85). From out of this phenomenon what Heidegger terms “original questions” spring forth. Original questions never terminate in definitive answers, they can never be closed-off, and the most original question for Socrates, as Heidegger informs us, is the “Greek ti estin,” or “what is the essence of x?” Since we have said philosophy has its beginning (arche) in thaumazein, and original questions also have their origin in the pathos of wonder, this beginning, according to Heidegger, gives rise to a questioning that “pushes [Socrates] into the open,” and as an original questioning, it “transforms itself (as does every genuine questioning), and casts a new space over and through everything” (Heidegger 2001: 32/23).

The type of truth consistent with “doctrinal” readings of Plato’s Socrates is the form of knowledge that can be grounded, as we saw in Heidegger’s reading of Plato, in “correctness,” but contrarily, Heidegger’s Socrates, might be said to, as Kirkland contends, devote himself to the pursuit of “truth,” which presupposes an “attitude toward his subject matter in which he does not impose his will upon it,” but rather, “aims to allow it to come to light in his discourse” (Kirkland 2010: 51, my emphasis). This is precisely the manner in which Plato in Letter Seven describes philosophical understanding as an original form of aletheia, which manifests in dialogue, but “cannot at all be expressed in words as other studies can, but instead, from living with the subject itself in frequent dialogue a light is kindled from a leaping flame comes to be in the soul where is presently nourishes itself” (Plato 1997: 341b-d my emphasis). Let us explore this notion of Socratic truth as it might relate to Heidegger’s philosophy in a bit more detail by looking to the early Greek experience of aletheia, which is by now quite familiar to readers of Heidegger, as an encounter with unhiddenness (un-concealment) linked intimately with hiddenness (concealment) as the ground for its possibility, the possibility as entities presencing or showing up for our
appropriation - in their givenness - in the first instance. As stated, Plato misinterpreted this primordial understanding of truth as \( \textit{aletheia} \). Heidegger finds the original understanding of \( \textit{aletheia} \) in Heraclitus’ Fragment 123: \( \phi\upsilon\sigma\iota\zeta_\ldots\kappa\rho\upsilon\tau\tau\epsilon\sigma\theta\iota\alpha\phi\iota\lambda\epsilon\iota \), which might be translated in a straightforward manner as, “Nature has an affinity for hiding or remaining hidden.” However, Heidegger renders it as, to return to the language of the “sway” within which Socrates thinks, “the holding sway of beings, i.e., beings in their being, loves to conceal itself” (Heidegger 2002: 9). We get this understanding of \( \textit{aletheia} \) in Kirkland’s “non-idealist” reading of Plato’s Socrates in pursuit of the \textit{phenomenal Being} of the virtues. In the course of questioning and interrogating the initial appearance of the virtue present to the \textit{doxa}, as opposed to definitions or ideas filling the content of consciousness, “what emerges into truth through the questioning of the \textit{doxa} with Socrates is ‘what virtue \textit{it}’, but it is not brought to stand in propositional language, but rather remains “unspoken,” and indeed this living and instantiating the nourishment of indelible truth, like a flashing light into the soul marks the true “success” of the dialectic, for “it marks the limit of virtue’s appearing to us, disturbing our \textit{doxa} and pointing thereby beyond them to what is present in \textit{doxa} only in exceeding it” (Kirkland 2010: 115).

Kirkland argues, in his analysis of the \textit{pathein-of-truth} (“suffering under” truth), the experience of \textit{aletheia} is not only “excessive” it can also be “dangerous” in the sense of it representing an encounter with \textit{ta deinon}, or the awe-inspiring presence of truth as an excessive force or phenomenon, which “resists being delimited and made intelligible, not merely frustrating our specific expectations, but radically calling into question what we presumed to be the limits of ‘what is,” even of the possible” (Kirkland 2010: 49), and here we understand Heidegger’s claim regarding Socrates demonstrating the “courage” to hold himself in the dialectic’s unfolding and resisting the temptation, to which others fall victim, of fleeing-in-the-face of truth. \textit{Aletheia}, as philosophical understanding, appears as the flashing flame within a momentary revelation, as an intimation of truth, where there is the concomitant movement or recession of what appears into mystery, and certain aspects of the virtue - and its very essence - remain concealed (Magrini 2017; 2018). Thus, as opposed to the type of propositional or axiomatic certainty that many analytic interpreters of Plato link with the (potential) philosopher-rulers’ practice of the dialectic in the \textit{Republic}, e.g., Sahakian and Sahakian (1977), it is possible to grasp Socrates’ notion of \textit{philosophical understanding} in the following terms: (1) It is a form of \textit{insight} that although emerging from a discursive process of dialogue, it itself non-discursive; (2) it is non-propositional, but it is not reducible to rote or basic “know-how,” this because it is a “normative” form of \textit{insight}; (3) It is manifest and comes-to-presence only in the midst of dialogue or the practice of the philosophical method; (4) It is neither wholly subjective nor object and rather it mediates both realms, and is also reflexive in nature as a potential form of “self-knowledge” (Gonzalez 1998; Kirkland 2010; Hyland 1995; Magrini 2017; 2018). Turning to Notomi’s “non-doctrinal” analysis of Platonic truth in \textit{dialogue-and-dialectic}, it is possible to understand this characterization of \textit{aletheia} as related to Socrates in the “draft” and “sway” of his inquiry as “primarily the soul’s ability (\textit{dunamis})
and process of engaging properly in a dialogue” (Notomi 2004: 2), and it is now
to the issue of the dialectic and the practice thereof in Heidegger’s Socrates that we turn.

When working to separate the sophist off from Socrates - or Socratic
philosophy - the real philosopher, the ontos philos, is describes as embodying
the vocation, task, or “occupation” that looks upon the bios, as this term and
concept is set off from zoi. This indicates for Heidegger that the philosopher is
not concerned with the life of things and entities set within the “nexus of
animals and plants, of everything that crawls and flies,” but rather the “sense of
existence, the leading of a life, which is characterized by a determinate telos, a
telos functioning for the bios, itself as an object of praxis” (Heidegger 1998: 168),
and for this reason, we refer to philosophy as a way-of-Being in the world. The
philosopher is concerned with existence, the living out of various kinds of life,
and beyond, makes a determination regarding which life or types of lives (bioi) it
is best to live. For Socrates, as we have already seen, this is a life in pursuit of
excellence and the “good” and it is a life that is inseparable from the practice of
the dialectic or dialektikê - the practice and way-of-Being that is at once a living with
the logos. We note that unlike typical “doctrinal” readings of Plato that view the
dialectic as a tool or trusted method for arriving at certain truth, truth grasped
in and through noein - where the hypothetical method is jettisoned, as described in
the Republic - Heidegger points out the dialectic’s flaws, problems that Plato
does not overcome. Gonzalez, in his reading of the Sophist, informs us that the
“logos pervading all forms of disclosing…has a tendency to conceal,” as such,
what the dialectic aims at is what amounts to the transcendence of language or
the logos, by way of “proceeding through (dia) logos,” and “its ultimate aim, that
towards which it is inherently directed must be a pure seeing or noein beyond
logos” (Gonzalez 2004: 18). However, the dialectic can never accomplish this
end and so has an “inherent tendency toward a ‘pure seeing’ that it can never
attain” (Gonzalez 2004: 19). This appears to render the dialectic a failed project,
however, there are positive elements associated with the dialectic as practiced
by Socrates, despite it failing to rise to the level of trustworthiness granted in
doctrinal readings of Plato. It is successful within limits, and there are positive
aspects of the Socratic dialectic that relate to truth, education, and the potential
development of the character (hexis).

So, if the dialectic is limited, according to Heidegger, what can it accomplish
as it relates directly to a “Socratic” philosophy? In a response requiring some
explanation, we attempt to show that the dialectic is beneficial to a
philosophical life, as described above, in that it instantiates a way-of-Being that is
educational or heuristically educative in its essence. The dialectic is a process that is
disclosive, according to Gonzalez, but it discloses things “indirectly, negatively,
and ‘reflexively’ (i.e., through the process of philosophy itself)” (Gonzalez 2004: 38). “Negatively,” in this case, as Heidegger brings to our attention, refers to
“denial” by means of legein, and the “saying ‘no,’ is a letting be seen,” and is not,
a reference in words to that which amounts to the bringing “of what is said to
nothing,” which is a naming that allows things to fade away or disappear into
“nothingness” (Heidegger 1999: 388). Rather, when “negation” possesses a
“disclosive character,” it possesses, “within the concrete uncovering of beings, a purifying [cathartic] function, so that negation itself acquires a productive character” (Heidegger 1999: 388). Negation is understood by Heidegger as an integral component of the Socratic dialectic, which is thought of as a process of “καθαρσις of the αγων by ἐλέγχος,” which works by “setting the δοξαι against each other through the συνάρτησις εις ἐν” (Heidegger 1999: 260) - the purification of ignorance through the questioning and synthesizing through the gathering of beliefs and opinions held by those who are engaged in the dialogue. In this process, what is “positive”- and here we recall Plato’s claim in Letter Seven about the leaping flame of truth that settles in the soul, which transforms it through periagoge, or the soul’s turning back or around to itself enlightened, which is an “educative” (paideutic) occurrence - is the partial and limited revelation of the matter under discussion, i.e., the partial appearance of elusive phenomenal Being of the virtues. What Heidegger indicates about what is “positive” in the dialectic, he links intimately with a “Socratic attitude,” which achieves the “positive only in actually carrying it out,” by living within the draft and sway of the inquiry and not in terms of the dialectic producing “positive” results in terms of “truth” that somehow stands at the end, and hence beyond, the inquiry itself (Heidegger 1999: 368), i.e., we are transformed within the dialectic, only within the process itself, and not by some result it might produce. How this “enlightenment” occurs, however, is not clearly explicated by Heidegger, however, in relation to his reading, we explore this issue by turning to “non-doctrinal” readings of Plato’s Socrates’s practice of elenchus-dialectic in the attempt to show that, although never culminating in noetic insight of the so-called “truth” of the essence of virtue, the logoi, in rigorous, well-meaning discourse, does demonstrate a revelatory capacity in the process of questioning, refuting (negating), and winnowing out the doxai that are shown to be problematic and questionable.

Heidegger describes the practice of the dialectic as a vigorous questioning (διεροται) with the purpose of shaking one out of familiar and complacent modes of knowing where many doxai are brought together and set in tension in relation to that which is questioned or “one and the same thing” (Heidegger 1999: 260). Beyond simply assuming oppositional roles, the doxai, as Heidegger stresses, within the discourse, the “opinions’ as it were, slap each other in the face” (Heidegger 1999: 261), and there is the “casting out [απαλλαγη] of ungenuine δοξαι,” and a “clearing away,” or a “removal of what stands in the way of the μαθηματα, the proper positive learning” (Heidegger 1999: 262), which demonstrates the function of “ακβαλλεται,” the act of casting out ignorance and transcending ἀμαθεία (Heidegger 1999: 258) in a way that “clarifies” or “purifies” (καθαρσις) the soul. Indeed, when Heidegger describes the context of the Socratic dialectic and dialogue, and here we should recall Heidegger’s description of the philosopher’s life as introduced above, “it is not a dwelling with the material content of knowledge,” i.e., not a concern for content-over-method, or propositional knowledge over a more vague and limited form of understanding, rather “it is a matter simply of the Being of Dasein itself: to what extent does it dwell in ἀληθης [understanding/truth of the
virtues and the “good” life] or in ἄγνωστος [ignorance of the virtues and the “good” life] (Heidegger 1999: 262). But how, returning to Heidegger’s critique of the dialectic, as a practice that is locked in language, and hence cannot transcend language in its pursuit to arrive at the place of noēn, a pure form of seeing that is beyond the logos, is it possible to imagine “truth” emerging from a practice driven by and at once limited by language? Gonzalez observes that what philosophy requires is a form of speech, or manner of approaching discourse, that “breaks through speech in a process of ‘speaking for and against,’” in a way that might direct our “attention beyond what is said, thereby leading us more and more to the matter under discussion and letting it be seen” (Gonzalez 2004: 18). If we take into consideration what Heidegger has said regarding the Being of Dasein as representing the true philosopher’s concern in relation to what he claims about “dialogue” in What is Called Thinking? perhaps it is possible to suggest a response to this issue as it relates to Socratic dialectic. Heidegger informs us that if “dialogue” focuses exclusively on “what is directly said” and what might be directly known through this saying, dialogue “becomes haulting and fruitless” (Heidegger 1968: 178). However, if inquirers in the dialogue “involve each other in that realm and adobe about which they are speaking,” and as we have seen, for Heidegger, this realm of original questioning gives rise to “speaking,” they inhabit the site of thought in its relation to the essential truth of Being,” and “lead each other to it” to dwell in the “soul of the dialogue,” and so the speakers are “led into the unspoken,” i.e., what emerges from logos but is irreducible to it (Heidegger 1968: 178).

To approach an understanding of how this movement into the unspoken through the logos might occur in the unfolding of the Socratic dialectic, we consider Gonzalez’s (1998) and Gadamer’s (1988) insightful analyses of Plato’s Letter Seven, focusing on the manner in which the four ways of knowing contend in order to open a vista for the presencing of the “fifth way,” or brief insight, a truth barely seen, in the midst of the dialectic as this phenomenon might occur through the winnowing process of clearing away the negative and making space for the positive in dialectic as Heidegger describes above. In Letter Seven, Plato discusses four ways of knowing: (1) names/words, (2) images/figures, (3) propositions, and (4) resulting insight (knowing). Plato also discusses a “fifth way” that occurs from out of these, and it is a form of philosophical insight (philosophical understanding) that he stresses is ineffable; it cannot be spoken of like other things philosophers discuss, and it certainly does not possess the degree of certainty required to ground any systematic doctrine (Plato 1997: EP VII 341c).

Whereas Heidegger elicits the imagery of the doxai in and through dialogic exchange, “slapping against each other,” in both Gonzalez (1998) and Gadamer (1988), we encounter a similar metaphor, that of the dialectic unfolding as process wherein the doxai or “ways of knowing” are rubbed against each other, and this relates to the notion of language’s potential transparency in relation to the Greek term that Plato employs, ἐρίβην, “to rub down.” Ideally, in the dialectic, we might imagine words fading into the background so that the meaning shines forth in a clear and pristine manner. However, as Gadamer informs us, in the “rubbing” of the four ways together in dialectic, they “assert
themselves as whatever particular thing they are instead of fading out of view,” and this indicates that language, a critique we are familiar with in reading Heidegger, fails to achieve the proper level of transparency in order to let the “thing itself” (Being of virtue) move to the fore unimpeded and be seen in the fullness of its self-showing (Gadamer 1988: 105). Now, if we consider what Gonzalez contends about the Greek term *tribein*, as a “process of a vigorous rubbing that wears things down” (Gonzalez 1998: 265), or wears them away, it is possible to understand the process of truth-happening in Plato’s *Letter Seven*. As we move through the four ways, rubbing each against the other, there occurs a “wearing down” of the language, so to speak. The more intensely we seek to clarify the names, images, and propositions we employ to ground our knowledge, the more the words/images begin to wear down and away; they recede, as it were, and a partial and momentary transparency of language occurs, and the fleeting light of truth shines forth, like a *leaping flame* (Magrini 2014). In more direct terms, according to Gonzalez, through the “process of question and answer in which we expose the weakness of the words, propositions, and images we use,” we are afforded a momentary and partial vista into truth, and “just barely glimpse through their cracks the true being which they all attempt but fail to express” (Gonzalez 1998: 268). It is possible to link the “fifth way” of “barely” knowing the “thing itself” with the moment when language reaches its limited, but disclosive potential as a transparent medium for *aletheia*.

This is not, however, to indicate that this form of insight transcends language usage entirely, or that it is a moment when truth is fully disclosed with no dissembling or hiddenness, because this moment of truth-happening occurs only in and through the vigorous use of language, which is always grounded in human limitation and radical finitude. As Gonzalez stresses, in a way we relate to our reading of Heidegger’s Socrates, this unique, fleeing, and fragile instance of *philosophical insight* as described is not and can never be “the kind of knowledge that will put an end to all inquiry or that can be ‘grasped’ once and for all” (Gonzalez 1998: 267), and it requires ever-renewed attempts to bring it to light, which requires the participants in the dialectic, as Heidegger has stressed in relation to Socrates, to hold themselves in the draft of the inquiry, for as Plato stresses, whatever we learn must be learned together, “through long and earnest labor” (Plato 1997: *EP VII* 344b). To further contribute to this line of thought as related to a theme we have already discussed, Kirkland stresses that this process of “truth-happening” highlights the ontological distance that the human being is situated from full disclosure of truth, which is always given in an obscure, oblique, and partially veiled manner. However, the dedicated participants agree to inhabit this “site of distance from but nonetheless toward the being of virtue” (Kirkland 2010: xxii), and this indicates that we “abide with *doxa* while pointing beyond it and to its limits” (Kirkland 2010: 114). In relation to what Kirkland has identified as the *deinos* associated with philosophical insight, this is a *distressing distance* from Being, but one that is at once protreptic, i.e., in an important way, alluring and inspirational, which establishes our relationship to issues that remain “as concealed, hidden, and thus questionworthy” (Kirkland 2010: 55), we are drawn, as Heidegger indicates
regarding Socrates, in the pursuit of that which withdraws from our grasp, and in its withdrawal it beckons us to continue our pursuit, because it is truly worthy of our continued questioning and represents the very essence of an education directed toward those things that are most beneficial for our souls. The site of the dialectic - the ever-developing, ever-expanding context of originary learning - which is the locus of distance and the excess of truth, “belongs essentially to the site opened by melete,” which is related directly to Plato’s Socrates avowed practice of philosophy as care for the soul (as a paideutic practice), “by our being originally concerned by the being of virtue, compelled to be toward it in its withdrawal” (Kirkland 2010: 114).

**Paideia as Philosophical Task and Way-of-Being**

**A Socratic Notion of Truth and Method in Learning**

In what we have described in these foregoing sections, might be said to represent an originary understanding of method and truth in Socratic philosophy, as a practical way-of-Being or living out of one’s existence attuned to the understanding that this also instantiates a life-of-learning, in terms of what Heidegger describes, in relation to the undeniable Socratic influence on Plato’s philosophy, as a way of life, a way-of-Being that is “on the way” (unterwegs) to learning, which can never be equated with, to return to our earlier description of contemporary standardized education, the “application” of methods in the pursuit of “acquiring” sure and certain knowledge in education. Learning in a manner associated with Heidegger’s Socrates is never reducible to the rote accumulation of the day’s lessons, to be rehearsed on exams that calculate and assess the “proficiency” level of the student in memorizing and regurgitating the lesson; this is not Socratic learning, which we argue can never be authentically reproduced in the classroom, e.g., Socratic Seminar. Heidegger assures us of this when observing that παιδεία is not education as described above, rather it is “πραγμάτεια, a task, and hence not a self-evident possession,” and further, it is not merely a “task any person can take up according to whim but is one which precisely encounters in each person its own proper resistances” (Heidegger 1999: 258). Heidegger recognizes that learning, just as is the case with thinking, is something we must first begin to “learn,” for learning in an essential way “means to make everything we do answer to whatever essentials address themselves to us at a given time” (Heidegger 1968: 14). Education calls for, as opposed to the speaking of monologues or the delivering of lectures, an attuned mode of “listening” in advance for the call of education itself, and here, we return to the arche of authentic philosophy - from out of which we are attuned and continually guided and directed by original issues and questions - and the “unspoken” essence in dialogue - which reveal “truth” that partially and momentarily nourishes the soul in such a way that we are at once challenged by it and enticed to continue on in the pursuit to better understand it, to bring to light further aspects of it that are hidden.

Education, or authentic learning, as understood and practiced by Heidegger’s Socrates, is an ongoing and ever-renewed “task” - recall Heidegger’s understanding of education as “πραγμάτεια,” as exercise or labor.
- that is instantiated within the educational practice of the elenchus-dialectic, which according to Heidegger, “provides the positive only in actually carrying it out and not by making it the direct theme of reflection” (Heidegger 1999: 368) and then producing objective instances of knowledge that terminate the method or process. Based on our speculative reading of Heidegger’s Socrates, what we term the originary context of education, which shelters the draft of authentic thinking and learning, unfolds in the following manner, grounded in the understanding that in learning there occurs a two-fold movement, captured by Heidegger’s use of the Greek term, “απώλεια”:

1. Our soul moves away from ignorance or amathia and
2. Because of the excessive and elusive nature of that which we seek to reveal, it moves away from us, from the scope and parameters of our inquiries, and we are set at a distance from the full disclosure of the essence of what we are inquiring into. Admittedly, if this two-fold movement fully captured the process we identify as paidiea, the situation of learning would indeed appear frustratingly pessimistic in the extreme, however, there is a third component that is inseparable from the movement that Heidegger importantly stresses, namely, (3) that we are attuned within this process and at once transformed, drawn toward and to the very thing that withdraws from our inquiry. In relation to this concern, we argue that authentic learning occurs within the dynamic “draft” created by the counter-striving movement between thought and what is thought set within the ontological context that instantiates our relationship to the essential truth of Being, and this movement is highlighted, as is the case with Socrates, by the back-and-forth of the question-rejoinder-refutation of the dialectic in praxis - all the while, as Heidegger reminds us, there is an attendance to what remains “unspoken” in the dialogue (Heidegger 1968: 178), i.e., our encounter with alethia. When learning, as stated, we are inspired - attuned and held fast in wonder (thaumazein) - to continually inquire into that which withdraws from full disclosure, “drawn to what withdraws” (Heidegger 1968: 17), and in this process, we are located at a distance from the essential nature of what remains question-worthy, and hence worthy of our educational pursuits, and here we experience a way-of-Being within a context of thinking highlighted the “mutual nearness of its appeal” (Heidegger 1968: 17). So, within this questioning in the midst of this distance from truth, a proximity we can never close off, although distressing, we find inspiration to continue on, for this thinking at a distance is attuned to continue on in the pursuit of what withdraws from our inquiry. In learning, the partial and oblique revelation of truth, or the intimation of truth, has nourished the soul, inspires us to hold ourselves in the ever-evolving draft of thinking, for like Socrates, if we are attuned to the “call” of education itself, we do “nothing else then place [ourselves] into this draft, this current, and maintain [ourselves] in it” (Heidegger 1968: 17), for it is only in this draft that enlightenment and authentic education can occur.

Heidegger informs us that because Socrates is drawn into what withdraws, “he points into what withdraws,” and in this way we might think of him as serving as a “sign, a pointer,” but what he is pointing at is “something which has not, not yet, been transposed into the language of our speech” (Heidegger
1968: 18), indeed, still to this day, what Socrates philosophized—which he could not properly or systematically bring to language—has not yet been understood by a majority of educators, who are “like those people who run to seek refuge from any draft too strong for them” (Heidegger 1968: 17). In the presence of Heidegger’s Socrates, we find ourselves faced with the practice of education that is not only foreign but radically at odds with the way we as contemporary educators view education. For education as described relating to and emerging from Heidegger’s Socrates cannot be reduced to the type of method that can be successfully reproduced or imitated in the classroom with the aim of producing the result of learning that can be gauged through quantification. To even attempt to “thematize” or “systematize” it would serve only to bastardize its unique and original essence, indeed to write it down in the service of a systematized curriculum with the requisite “lesson-plans” already betrays Heidegger’s point about one of the things that makes Socrates the purest thinker of the West, namely, “he wrote nothing,” and if he would have attempted to do so, he would have turned away from authentic thought, or “pure thought,” to become a “fugitive” of thought (Heidegger 1968: 17-18). Thus, a Socratic education drawn from Heidegger’s reading is a form of learning and education, to continue our theme drawn from contemporary Platonic scholarship, by its very essence, must remain non-systematic; it cannot become a doctrine in the sense that we in education understand it today. However, it is our hope that this essay might work in service of offering Socratic intimations of and gestures toward—despite how veiled these elucidations must remain—inspiring new and potentially fecund thinking on the ways we currently go about educating our students, offering philosophical insights into the potential re-conceptualization of what we currently understand about the standards for methods, truth, and learning. For the education we have described, as related to Heidegger’s Socrates, depends on a genuine form of questioning that lies at the heart of the educational experience, where deep transformation and attunement to the soul (psyche) or disposition (hexis) occurs—here we understand the pathos-of-education in Heideggerian terms as a “tuning” or “turning” of the “dis-position and determination” (Heidegger 1959: 83)—i.e., the soul in periagoge turned back to itself enlightened, and it is enlightened in and through a unique and non-doctrinal, non-systematic understanding of the experience of truth as aletheia, in the occurrence of aletheuein as it is inseparable from the originary context of education, which shelters the draft of authentic thinking and learning: authentic paideia.

Notes
1. As related to Fn. vi. below, readers are encouraged to reference George Lazaroiu’s (2018) article, “The Socratic Process of Learning: Being-Educated as a Philosophical Way of the Ethical Life,” which works to bring together contemporary empirical (theoretically-based) research to bear on the questions and issues emerging from a “non-doctrinal” reading of the dialogues. This essay also makes an important contribution to re-thinking and re-envisioning the Socratic Method as it has been traditionally embraced and practiced for years by educators in classrooms. Lazaroiu shares the view that in relation to a so-called “Socratic Method,” the notions of truth, method, and the process of learning
must be reconceived in a way that stands opposed to typical standardized epistemological models.

2. Heidegger’s reading of Plato’s philosophy (metaphysics) as “doctrinal” in nature is not limited to Platonic scholars, e.g., Poggler (1987), commenting on Heidegger’s path of thinking, recognizes that Heidegger embraces a “doctrinal” and systematic Plato. “Plato,” writes Poggler, “turns his attention not to the counteraction between unconcealment and concealment, but rather to unconcealment as mere ‘unconcealment,’ as mere revealing” (80/102), thus giving rise to a systematic metaphysics, education, and later, secular humanism.

3. Contrary to Hyland, Fried (2006) points out – although he does not refer to Heidegger’s readings as “doctrinal” in nature - that, for Heidegger, it is not that Plato is consciously teaching a systematic doctrinal philosophy; rather, it is the manner in which what is “unsaid” in Plato’s philosophy is formalized or “said” by and within the tradition, and the main concern is with “the translation of truth as aleteia from unconcealment (Unvernogenheit) to the correctness of representation [orhtotes],” of what is present before us in terms of an entity or a being (157). Fried adds the following caveat to his reading: “Heidegger at times, insists even in specific readings of Plato’s texts, that he is confronting not Plato but Platonism” (157). Despite Heidegger’s reductive readings of Plato, Fried stresses that we must not underplay the importance of Heidegger’s readings, “for whatever critiques postmodern philosophers have of Heidegger, many postmodernists owe a debt of thinking to Heidegger,” this is because they have “accepted [his] reading of Plato as a decisive turn in the Western march toward nihilism” (157).

4. Heidegger’s (1999) claim is that the “essence of παιδεία” is understood in the “προσωπη της ψυχής,” which Heidegger identifies as the educative movement characterized by the “turning around the whole human being” from an encounter with beings or things to the encounter with Being that first facilitates the revelation of those beings and things for their potential appropriation (167).

5. For example, in the Symposium, Socrates assures Agathon that authentic education can neither be pursued nor carried out as a process through which those who have little in the way of knowledge are made more knowledgeable by those possessing greater knowledge, as “if ideas were the kind of things which could be imparted simply by contact, and those of us who had few could absorb them from those who have a lot,” much like the “way that liquid can flow from a full container to an empty one if you put a piece of string between them” (175d).

6. Overlooking the plausible conclusion offered by many Platonic scholars regarding the lack of a codified method in Plato’s Socrates, Socratic Circles, Socratic Method, and Socratic Seminar (Wilberding 2014; Strong 1997) are all formalized Socratic Methods for application in the classroom. Educators implementing Socratic Seminars argue that Socrates employs a reproducible systematic method that can be explicated, packaged, marketed, taught, and applied in the classroom to produce definitive “academic” results that meet the criteria for the objectives in Common Core State Standards Curriculum and the concomitant high-stakes testing consistent with the contemporary standardized view of education. These educators claim that Socrates’ way of practicing his dialectic examination can be systematized and imitated. In relation to this claim, we bring the reader’s attention to a crucial issue Plato highlights in the Apology, to which practitioners of the Socratic method in education have apparently paid
no heed or have summarily dismissed, namely, the utterly and unmistakably disastrous results that ensued when the youths of Athens attempted to “imitate” the enigmatic and inimitable Socrates. Those who imitated Socrates contributed to the formulation of the charges against him, as they systematized, copied, and employed his supposed “method,” performing elenchus refutations of prominent Athenian citizens. Let us listen to Socrates, who proclaims, “The sons of the richest men accompany of their own accord, find pleasure in hearing people being examined, and often imitate me themselves, and then they undertake to examine others; and then, I fancy, they find a great plenty of people who think they know something, but know little or nothing. As a result, therefore, those who are examined by them are angry with me (Plato 1997, Apol. 23c-e). It is interesting to note, in relation to “Socratic teaching,” that as opposed to training or teaching (didasko) these youths to be upstart “gadflies,” it is by chance (tuche) and neither by Socratic design nor the implementation of any formal or even informal “Socratic curriculum,” that these youths are drawn to Socrates, listen intently to him, and then take it upon themselves to imitate him (Magrini 2017; 2018).

7. Heidegger (1988) defines phenomenology in precisely the same manner, as a “method” within which truth manifests that cannot be jettisoned once we have arrived at it, e.g., when talking of interpreting facticity, Heidegger is clear that this interpretation can be nothing other than “living” it, for only in interpretive activity is Dasein’s possibility for “becoming and being for itself” made known and pursued; ἐρμηνευτική (the interpreting of facticity), is a method for living and acquiring “an understanding of itself” (11). This observation is made by Gonzalez (2009) when stating in his reading of Socrates, “the truth of philosophy is its method,” for “Socrates himself, at least as depicted in Plato, places much more emphasis on method than on results, not only because his discussions are often aporetic, but also, and more importantly, because he appears to value more the process of dialectic and dialogue than any outcome of this process” (427).

8. Original passages from Plato’s (1997) Letter Seven will assist the reader in understanding the analysis we have provided, and they run as follows: “Only when all of these things – names, definitions, and visual and other perceptions – have been rubbed against one another and tested, pupil and teacher asking, and answering questions in good will and without enmity – only then, when reason and knowledge are at the very extremity of human effort, can they illuminate the nature of any object (344b)…[but] this knowledge is not something that can be into words like other sciences; but only after long-continued discourse between teacher and pupil, in joint pursuit of the subject, suddenly, like a light flashing forth when a fire is kindled, it is born of the soul and straightaway nourishes itself” (341c).

9. In Gonzalez’s (2004) reading of Socratic philosophy and the dialectic, he stresses that philosophy is an endeavor where truth and method are inseparable, and “the truth of the matter shows itself, not in some definition or teaching that would conclude philosophical questioning, but rather in the very carrying out of this questioning” (427). If we relate the issue of “pure thinking” to an education that would be consistent with because it is instantiated by Heidegger’s Socrates, the ever-renewed practice of the dialectic requires, as Gonzalez elucidates, a form of pure thinking that is “always underway and yet so in touch with the being of the matter in question as to be continually changed by it,” i.e., a thinking in relation to truth that can never be brought to full unhiddenness and yet still
holds the supreme power to transform the soul (epagoge), and this thinking “pays more attention to the way,” or practice and movement of the dialectic, “than to the content without becoming contentless,” or devolving into a transposable, applicable, formable, and hence, empty method, and this is the type of pure thinking “transforms without instructing” (431).

10. We undoubtedly get the sense of απαλλαγή (apallage) referring to the “casting out” of ignorance through dialectic. But this term can also indicate, as we have suggested, in addition to “deliverance, release, riddance of a thing,” the “going away” or taking a “departure” from a thing, hence our reference to truth’s movement away from our understanding as well as the movement away that we experience from our previous state of ignorance in the midst of the dialectic (Lexicon, 76).

References


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