Important aspects of Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy that could not be known through Husserl's own publications during his lifetime*

Iso Kern
Professor, University of Bern, Switzerland, Email: isokern@bluewin.ch

Abstract
In this paper I discuss some significant aspects of Husserl's phenomenology which could not be adequately known without studying the manuscripts, unpublished during his lifetime and then published gradually since 1950 by Husserl Archives in Leuven founded by Father van Breda in 1939. The aspects I discuss here are listed under 6 subjects: Husserl's phenomenological analyses of the constituting corporeal subjectivity, Husserl's phenomenological analysis of the conditions of possibility of representifications, concept of I-consciousness, conception of transcendental subjectivity as intersubjectivity, the development of Husserl's conception of phenomenological philosophy, and Husserl's metaphysics. This paper is drawn from, and an extension of, a lecture given at the Catholic University of Louvain in the occasion of 80th anniversary of the foundation of the Husserl Archives.

Keywords: Phenomenology, Husserl's metaphysics, representification, I-consciousness, intersubjectivity

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Lecture given in December 13th at the Higher Institute for Philosophy at the Catholic University of Louvain for the celebration of the 80th anniversary of the foundation of the Husserl Archives.
I am aware that my purpose to speak about the topic: “Important aspects of Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy that could not be known through Husserl’s own publications during his lifetime” sounds very ambitious. But this question is also addressed to all those here present who have edited one or the other volume of the Husserliana and to all those who have read parts of the Husserliana. I shall try to answer this question from the limited point of view of my own philosophical interests, of the three volumes edited by myself and of what I have read in some others of the now about 40 volumes of the Husserliana. I confess that I didn’t read all these volumes and that I have forgotten much of what I have read, even forgotten much of the texts I published myself. And I try to answer this big question in the limited time of a lecture which should not last longer than one hour. Therefore I have to make choices. And finally I am sadly aware that my limited English confines still more my limited thoughts.

I shall approach the following subjects:

1. **Husserl's phenomenological analyses of the constituting corporeal subjectivity** (leibliche Subjektivität)
2. **Second**: Husserl’s phenomenological analysis of the conditions of possibility of representifications (Vergegenwärtigungen),
3. **Third**: Husserl’s concept of I-consciousness (Ichbewusstsein),
4. **Fourth**: Husserl’s conception of transcendental subjectivity as intersubjectivity,
5. **Fifth**: The development of Husserl’s conception of phenomenological philosophy,
6. **Sixth**: Husserl's metaphysics.

1. **Husserl's phenomenological analyses of the constituting corporeal subjectivity** (leibliche Subjektivität)

   I have here in mind above all the lectures from the summer-half-year 1907 *Ding und Raum*, edited in Hua XVI by Ullrich Claesges (Husserl 1973d), and the three volumes *Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity*, Hua XIII, XIV and XV edited by myself (Husserl 1973a,b,c). In the lectures on *Ding und Raum* the constitution of perceptual things and of perceptual space is analysed as an intentional activity of the bodily subject, seeing, touching, and kinesthetically moving itself around. This analysis shows that the perception of things and of space by the senses is not simply a form of receptivity or passivity, as is traditionally thought, but that the perception of things and of space is also an intentional activity of the subject. For Husserl therefore intentional activity of the subject is not a prerogative of the thinking subject, of the Cartesian *ego cogito* or of the Kantian “Ich denke”, but intentional activity of the subject is also kinesthetically moving itself around and constituting thereby subjective space and the things in it.

In many texts of the three volumes *Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity* the self-perceived own body here and the perceived body over there is a condition of possibility of intersubjectivity. Without the experiences of my own body and of foreign bodies intersubjectivity would not be possible. Leibniz too has defended the thesis that every finite monad qua point of view on the world must have a
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body, and that purely spiritual finite monads, such as the angels in Scholastic philosophy, are not possible. But Leibniz did not give to this thesis a phenomenological foundation as Husserl did. However Husserl did it not in his publications during his lifetime.

2. Husserl's phenomenological analyses of the conditions of possibility of representifications (Vergegenwärtigungen)

According to Husserl, representifications are for instance the remembering of one's own past, the thinking ahead about the future, the empathy (Einfühlen) in the experience of other subjectivities, i.e. other human beings and animals. Representifications are further the pure imaginations, so as the imagination of a battle between centaurs and dragons, and the imagining of possibilities and also picture-consciousness. In classical European philosophy nearly nothing can be found about this vast field of representifications, except about remembering. Plato talked about anamnēsis in order to explain how the human soul is able by itself, without perception and teaching from outside, to know mathematical truth and the whole world of ideas. Aristotle wrote in his last years the small but excellent text Peri mnēmēs kai anamnēseos ("About memory and remembering"). Saint Augustin wrote in his Confessiones in the famous chapter about time about the imagines of his remembering. The English empiricists, Locke and Hume, wrote about problems of memory. In personal Memoirs remembering was exercised; in Freud's psycho-analytic practice remembering was used there are research works on memory by psychologists of modern times. Remembering plays a very important role in human life, but it is never philosophically reflected as it deserves. But representifications as a systematic whole, including not only remembering, but also the other forms of representifications were never philosophically analysed and discussed before Husserl.

In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant distinguishes between transcendental Aesthetic and transcendental Logic (Kant 1998). "Transcendental Aesthetic" has to do with time and space as the conditions of possibility of intuition, and therefore as the conditions of possibility of mathematics and geometry and of empirical perception; "transcendental Logic" has to do with the conditions of possibility of concepts and judgments and logical conclusions and therefore as the conditions of possibility of the modern empirical sciences. Kant speaks in his "transcendental Logic" also about three modalities of judgments: problematic judgments, affirmative judgments (assertorische Urteile), and apodictic judgments. As far as I understand, a problematic judgment would have the form "possibly x is a". But Kant did not ask the question: Which are the conditions of possibility of a judgment about possibilities; one of these conditions would be representification of possibilities. Representifications (Vergegenwärtigungen) in the sense of Husserl do nowhere appear in the Critique of Pure Reason.

In Formal and transcendental Logic (which has the subtitle "Essay of a Critic of the Logical Reason" and was published in 1929) Husserl writes in the last paragraph (§ 107) about evidence of the "outer" (sensual) experience and the evidence of the "inner" experience but nothing about representifications
(Husserl 1969). He writes in this work also about the relation to the world (“Weltbezogenheit”) of traditional logic (§ 102). I think this relation to the world is the reason why representifications do not play a role in traditional logic and theory of knowledge. The world investigated in natural sciences is not a remembered or possible world, but what is for us present of this world, even if this world has, as we scientifically conclude, a long past and a future. Even scientific history of mankind or scientific history of an individual person does not investigate our remembered representified past, but investigates some for-us-present documents about the past or some present statements of some for-us-present persons, even if this person speaks about what she remembers or what she will do in the future.

Husserl was probably the first philosopher to investigate systematically the vast field of representifications as shows Husserliana XIII about intersubjectivity (Husserl 1973a) and then above all in volume XXIII, entitled “Imagination, Conscience of pictures and Remembering”, edited in 1980 by Eduard Marbach (Husserl 1980). For Husserl, knowledge consists not only in sensual perception and in conceptual judgments, but also in intuitive representifications. And intuition (Anschauung) is for him not only sensation as for Kant but also representificational intuition. This systematic philosophical discovery of the vast field of intuitive representifications, which are neither intuitive sensations nor conceptual judgements, seems to me a revolutionary discovery in philosophy. This revolutionary discovery was made known to the public by some editors of the Husserliana.

3. Husserl’s concept of the consciousness of I (Ichbewusstsein)

In 1912, during the process of writing of the first and second volume of his Ideas (Husserl 1976), the first book of which was published in 1913, Husserl, by describing the phenomena of attentiveness (Aufmerksamkeit) and of positing (Setzen), introduced the idea of a pure I. Before writing this work in 1912 he has never mentioned such an idea in the context of attentiveness and positing or anywhere else. As Eduard Marbach (1974, ch. 6) has shown in his book Das Problem des Ich in der Phänomenologie Husserls, Husserl introduced this idea in the first book of his Ideas only after many hesitations. In § 57 of this work he refers for this idea to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason: “The ‘I think’ has necessarily to accompany all my presentations (Das ‘Ich denke’ muss alle meine Vorstellungen begleiten können.)”. In § 80 Husserl writes that in the attentive experiences (in den aufmerkenden Erlebnissen) the I lives actually, and in § 37 he writes that in these experiences the I is turned towards (zugewandt) the intentional objects, that the I is directed towards them. Describing these attentive experiences, Husserl speaks also of “a ray of looking (Blickstrahl)”, going from the I to the intentional object, or of a “ray of the I (Ichstrahl) going from the I to the intentional object and from the intentional object to the I” (§ 92). About the non-attentive experiences (nicht aufmerkende Erlebnisse) Husserl writes, that they lack the special relation to the I” (§ 80). In § 122 of the Ideas I, Husserl writes: “Positing […] is the free activity and spontaneity of the pure I. [These positions] are radiations (Ausstrahlungen) out from it as from the most original source (Urquelle) of its productions (Erzeugungen) (Husserl
According to these quotations about the connectedness between attentiveness and positing on the one hand and the pure I on the other, the pure I seems necessarily to be part of the structure of a special sort of experiences, namely the attentive and the positing experiences. For Husserl then, Kant’s formula in his *Critique of Pure Reason* would have to be transformed in the following manner: The ‘I think’ has necessarily to accompany all my *attentive* and *positing* presentations (Das ‘Ich denke’ muss alle meine *aufmerksamen und setzenden* Vorstellungen begleiten können.)”

Some phenomenologists have criticized this idea of a pure I, mainly Jean-Paul Sartre in his “*La transcendance de l’Ego*” (Sartre 1992) and Aaron Gurwitsch in different articles (Gurwitsch 2010). From the phenomenological point of view the question is for me: By being attentive to something or by having an attentive experience (ein aufmerkendes Erlebnis), or by positing something as real, am I also necessarily conscious of a pure I or, what Husserl later called, of an I-pole (Ichpol)? I would answer: No. For instance by purely looking attentively to the sensually perceived signs of this paper before me and positing them as real, I am not conscious of an I; in a pure attentive sensation I am not conscious of a “ray of the I (Ichstrahl), going from the I to the intentional object and from the intentional object to the I”. And purely in positing something by sensation as real, I am not conscious of “radiations (Ausstrahlungen) out from an I as most original source (Urquelle) of its productions (Erzeugungen)”.

Someone could object to me: “You said: ‘In an attentive and positing sensation of something I am not conscious of a ray of the I’; this proves, that you are conscious of your I.” I would reply: “By saying ‘In an attentive and positing sensation of something I am not conscious of a ray of the I’, I was reflecting upon an attentive experience; that was the reason why I said “I am not conscious”. But when I do not reflect on an attentive and positing sensation, there is no conscience of such an I, and I am not always reflecting on what I am doing.

Husserl’s thesis, that attentiveness and positing, for instance attentiveness and positing in sensation, contains already a pure I, would have the strange consequence, that a cat, watching attentively before a mouse-hole and positing the hole and the mouse inside of it, would be immediately conscious of a “ray of the I (Ichstrahl), going from the I to the intentional object and from the intentional object to the I”.

**Reflection presupposes representification** (Vergegenwärtigung).

In Hua XIII (Husserl 1973a), text Nr. 10, written in the years 1914 or 1915, about different representifications, and in the text Nr. 15 of the same volume, written in September 1918 about reflection in representication, Husserl shows that explicit consciousness of I appears in a reflection inside representifications.

Text Nr. 10 written in 1914 or 1915 has the following Husserlian title: “Studies about intuitive representifications, i. e. remembering, imagination, representifications by images, with the special concern for the question of the thereby representified I and the possibility to represent I’s”. Husserl remarks
concerning these studies: “The aim of these studies was to learn something about the special sort of representification called empathy” (Hua XIII, p. 288 note 1). It seems to me that the guiding question of these studies is the following (I quote Husserl): “Is it not true of every representification that in a certain manner I am co-present [dass ich in gewisser Weise dabei bin] [in what is representified]? And can I, after all, represent experiences other than my own? How does the difference between my own experiences and foreign experiences, between my own ego and foreign egos, originate? Whatever I may representify, is representified as something in intentional experiences, in aspects [Apparenzen], in sense-data, in apprehensions, in attentions, etc., and these experiences are reproductively modified. But when I become [intuitively] absorbed in them, do they then not remain before me as my own representified experiences?” (Hua XIII, p. 298)

In these studies Husserl analyses first pure fantasy, second, consciousness of pictures, third, remembering and finally empathy (Einfühlung). By reasons of time limitation, I leave here out Husserl analysis of pure fantasy.

About the I in the pictorial world, Husserl says: “I behold in the picture this Greek cemetery represented [dargestellt] in it. Do I not have a position here, a relative place in the world of imagination from which I look at the cemetery as I do? Does not the appearance of a thing refer to a “here,” to a zero point of orientation? Certainly! […] But the ego, as this accidental, empirical ego, does not belong to it. The body could be arbitrarily transformed, but the picture would not be troubled by it. Only what belongs to the constitution of the appearance [of the Greek cemetery] cannot be taken away, and thus neither can be taken away the zero point of orientation, which itself can be changed. The “picture” is a “view” of a landscape. That is not a singular appearance, but a unity constituted by running through a manifold of appearances. […] I must look with my eyes in different directions. […] Consequently, I am necessarily co-present [dabei sein] after all. (Hua XIII, 290f.)

“Looking with my eyes” means here, according to Husserl, a real kinesthetic movement of my real eyes, and at the same time a movement of my “ideal” eyes looking around in the represented Greek cemetery. “The kinesthetic data are apprehended as actual movements of my eyes and at the same time as […] quasi-movements of my eyes, namely, images (perceptual images) of movements of eyes” (Hua XIII, p. 292).

This is not only true for the visual aspect of the Greek cemetery represented as picture-object: “Am I not also co-present actually and with all my senses? The imagined landscape [in the picture] contains marvelously smelling flowers, between the rocks flow cool springs, swelling moss invites me for a rest. […] Am I thus not fully and completely co-present as a bodily-mental ego? What can I strike away [from the scene]? My body could be different[…] […] The kinesthetic systems and the systems of appearances motivated by them, visually and tactually, are absolutely necessary.” (Hua XIII, p. 293)

I think the I appearing in this Husserlian text is still an abstract ego. It is not me, the existing ego, but neither is it the Kantian ego of the transcendental
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apperceptions, which has no kinesthetic systems and no sense perceptions (sensations).

About the I in the remembered world Husserl writes in this text from the years 1914 or 1915, that this remembered I is identical with the actual, remembering ego. The remembering ego, through the sequence of its remembering acts, extends back in the past as an enduring ego. The remembered ego is an embodied ego like the actual remembering ego. (I quote:) “The highest subject, which performs the coincidence of identification [between the remembered and the remembering ego], is the pure ego.” (Hua XIII, p. 303).

For myself, I find it difficult to see three egos in this account of remembering: the remembered ego, the remembering ego and the synthesizing (identifying) pure ego. I would say that there exists only one ego, which by reflection in remembering becomes conscious of itself: “I have done this, I have seen that.” I become conscious of myself as I, by reflexively remembering what I have done, or in the case of looking forward to my future by reflexively foreseeing, planning or deciding what I will or shall do. I dare say that an animal living only in its present surrounding world, having a multiplicity of different sensory and perceptual presentifications (“Gegenwärtigungen”) but no representifications (“Vergegenwärtigungen”), cannot reflect on its own intentional acts or intentional experiences and therefore has no ego-consciousness.

“In empathizing, Husserl writes, I only represent another I by representing myself with the body of the other and in the situation of the other. The ‘me’ is not yet differentiated here in the sense of the I and You. But we understand: Exactly as I am [by remembering] co-present (Dabei) in my [remembered] past, or [by imagining] in a fiction, likewise I am co-present in the psychic life of the other, representified by myself in empathy. But this being-co-present is not linked with the requirement of identification, as it is in my remembering of my past. The essence of remembering, the essence of the flow of consciousness, requires identification [of the I], carrying it necessarily with it. This being co-present (Dabei-sein) of the I [in remembering] is not linked with the requirement of contradiction [as it is in empathy]. [In empathy] the ego as the subject of the imagined [representified] acts shatters in contradiction with the given [acts of my I]. By the “requirement” brought forth by the foreign body, by the apperception [of foreign experiences], which is one with the [experience of the] foreign body, we have the positing of a life of consciousness, of sense fields, mental acts, etc. This positing remains without contradiction with anything of the actually given, and thus is maintained as a positing.” (Hua XIII, p. 319f.)

Explicit I-consciousness needs not only representification but reflection inside representification. In the text Nr. 15 of Husseriana XIII, written in September 1918, Husserl distinguishes between direct, simply representifying empathy and oblique, reflectively representifying empathy: “Direct empathy […] is natural empathy, and necessarily always the first one. The whole experience that we call “empathy” is of such a kind that it
encompasses a representification through which the direct doxic intention is directed towards what is experienced [the experienced things, objects] by the other subject. On the other side, oblique, reflexive empathy is such that it is directed towards either the phenomena in the [other's] experience, the aspects [of the things the other experiences], the sensual data, the apprehensions, or the experiencing [...] subject, [id est, the experiencing other I]” (Hua XIII, p. 401f.)

In Hua XIV (Husserl 1973b), text Nr. 15, written in 1923, Husserl writes: “The other is attainable for me in a double manner: not only by putting myself in his life in the mode of living-with while I am thematically directed [towards his experienced world], but also in reflection on his I and on his experiences and, at the same time, on the objects of which he is aware, which he posits and which I posit with him by taking them over undoubtedly.” (Hua XIV, 317)

What Husserl says about empathy can be said analogously also for instance about remembering or planning my future: By reflection in remembering I am aware that I have seen this or I have done that or I have not done that and by reflection in planning my future I am aware, that I shall hear this or done that.

I arrive to the conclusion of my point 3: The phenomenological I-consciousness in its most fundamental form appears, according to Husserl, through reflection in representification. This knowledge about the phenomenology of Husserl we do not achieve by reading Husserl’s works published during his life-time and probably even not by having attended to his lectures but only by having read some volumes of the Husserliana. This is so because all texts quoted in the third subject of my lecture: “Husserl’s concept of the consciousness of I (Ichbewusstsein)” are “Forschungsmanuskripte”, i.e. soliloquising manuscripts of research.

4.Husserl’s conception of the transcendental subjectivity as intersubjectivity

In Husserliana VIII (Husserl 1959), edited by Rudolf Boehm, Annex (Beilage) XX, written probably in the years 1921/22 ², Husserl writes: “Originally, I placed too much emphasis in this reduction [to pure consciousness] on the stream of consciousness, as if the reduction were a reduction to it. In any case, this was my first conception of the introduction of the phenomenological reduction in the year 1907 [in the “Five Lectures” (Husserl 1950)]. There is a fundamental error in this conception, but one that is not easily rendered transparent. This error is abolished with the “extension” of the phenomenological reduction to monadic intersubjectivity in the lectures of autumn 1910/11 [that is in the lectures “Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie” published in Husserliana XIII as text Nr. 6]. Already at that time [in autumn 1910/11] I pointed out that seemingly the reduction leads not only to the actual stream of consciousness [...]. The further elucidation rests upon the demonstration of the double reduction, to which all representifications [Vergegenwärtigungen] can be submitted, i.e., the reduction of the representifications as present experiences [gegenwärtige Erlebnisse], and the reduction “in” the
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representifications [the reduction of what is represented in the representifications].” (Hua VIII, p. 433f.)

Instead of speaking of a “double reduction,” it seems to me better to say that in those lectures of the years 1910/11 Husserl transformed the quasi-solipsistic phenomenological reduction by expanding it to the transcendental intersubjective field. This expansion is a reflexive explicitation of the representifying acts of empathy of the phenomenologizing ego. In fact, “double reduction” cannot mean two reductions, it means in fact two steps in one transcendental reduction. In 1921, when Husserl began to prepare his never written “new systematic work,” he reread and annotated the text of these lectures from 1910/11 and added at least four texts about the transcendental reduction to intersubjectivity achieved in these lectures (published in Hua XIII as annexes (Beilagen) XXVII, XXVIII and XXX and in Hua XLII (Husserl 2014) as annex XVIII). This indicates that, at that time, he planned to base this philosophy not only on one transcendental ego or a singular consciousness, but on transcendental intersubjectivity (cf. Hua XIV, p. 3, note 1). By my representifying act of remembering, my own past stream of consciousness is included in the transcendental field. Similarly, by my representifying act of empathy, intentional acts of other consciousnesses with their objective intentional correlates are included in this field. The transcendental sphere is no longer an ‘immanent’ sphere in the sense of being the sphere of all that appears to me, since other egos in their spheres have ‘things’ existing through appearances for them.

Whereas Kant’s “transzendentales Ich” does not allow for a plurality of Is, Husserl’s transcendental or absolute subjectivity is, like Leibniz’ universe of monads, an intentionally unified plurality having God, the “monad of monads” (the unity of unities), as its highest principle. The ordinary subjectivities of the others are intentionally included in the transcendental field as “transcendences” by my acts of empathy and by my social acts. God is included in this transcendental field on two grounds: first, as a condition of the possibility of the subjective constitution of the cosmic order of a world out of the factual and for us “accidental” hyletic data (Husserl speaks of God as a postulate of reason); and, second, as the telos of the transcendental-genetic development of human rationality and love.

Husserl’s “double reduction” consists, first, in the transcendental reduction to an abstract, solipsistic, Cartesian ego and then, as a second step, in extending the transcendental field by including other subjects in it. These other subjects are the intentional correlates of the empathic and social acts of my own concrete ego. As these other subjects are representified in my concrete subjectivity as my co-subjects (or co-constituting subjects), they are representified as constituting together with me our common intersubjective world from their own different “points of view” in their own constituting intentional acts. They are in turn representified by me as reciprocally including my own subjectivity by constituting me through their different kinds of empathizing and social intentional acts.

Until the end of his life, Husserl emphasized the parallelism between on the one hand remembering (in a broad sense), which constitutes the whole
lifestream of the ego, and, on the other hand, empathy, which constitutes the lifestreams of other egos. In this way, through representification, the whole universe of human monads is cognitively constituted. In a text written 1932 or 1933, published in Husserliana XV (Husserl 1973c) as annex XLI, Husserl writes: “In the explication of myself, I come across different representifications, and therein I come across what is representified as such. Among these representifications I come across acts of empathy [Einfühlungen]. More exactly, we must differentiate here between remembering acts as simple representifications and, in relation to them, empathizing representifications. Through remembering acts my successive temporal being is constituted in the modes of past, present, and future […]. […] In my immanent being is constituted a universe of what is foreign, i.e., [a universe] of co-beings [Mitseiende] displaying the sense alter ego[.]” (Hua XV, pp. 588f.)

I mentioned, that in 1921 Husserl began the preparation for a new systematic work. This work should replace his never accomplished Ideas. This can only be known by the texts written in the years 1921 and 1922 and published in Husserliana XIV, pp. 1 until 300. I see four reasons which at that time forced Husserl to conceive a new systematic work: First, according to an already quoted text, written in 1921 or 1922 and published by Rudolf Boehm in Hua VIII as Annex XX (pp. 432-439), Husserl had in these years the insight that his presentation of the transcendental reduction in his Ideas I could be misleading (irreführend). Second, he had the insight that the phenomenological reduction has to be extended to intersubjectivity. Third, he had since the years between 1917 and 1921 more and more the insight that, beside a static phenomenology, there has also to be a genetic phenomenology. Forth, since 1921 he had the insight that in a phenomenological philosophy experience has priority before imagination, respectively, that existence or fact has priority before possibility or eidos. On this insight I shall speak under the following subject.

5. The development of Husserl's conception of phenomenological philosophy

Until 1921/22, transcendental phenomenology for Husserl consisted of an eidetic phenomenology of the conditions of the possibility (essences) of transcendental intersubjectivity (first philosophy), and a phenomenological philosophy as a phenomenological interpretation of the objective sciences of the reality of the world (second philosophy). The first section of Husserl's Ideas I, “Essence and Knowledge of Essence”, concerned eidi (Hua II/1, 10ff., ”). Before 1921/1922 Eidi precede philosophy of reality like mathematics and geometry precede the modern mathematical sciences of reality. From the years 1921/22 onwards, in Husserl's phenomenological philosophy, the experience of reality of something precedes the presentation (Vorstellung) of its conditions of possibility, just as in the classic antic philosophy of Aristotle and of the middle ages energeia precedes dynamis, esse precedes posse. There is the saying: posse ab esse dicitur, possibility is spoken about, beginning from reality. It is important noting that this insight began with Husserl's analysis of empathy. It was probably in these years 1921/22, when he
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was preparing his “new systematic work”, that he first realized that the experience of one’s own existing ego precedes any a priori thought of the conditions of the possibility of an ego in general, and that an “ego in general” does not exist.

In Hua XV, text Nr. 22, written in 1931, regarding the eidos “transcendental ego” Husserl says the following: “We have here a strange and unique case, namely, the relationship between fact and eidos. The being [Sein] of an eidos, the being of eidetic possibilities and the universe of these possibilities, is independent of the being or non-being of any realization whatsoever of such possibilities […]. But the eidos “transcendental I” is unthinkable without a “transcendental I” as something factual. […] I cannot transgress my factual being, which entails that I cannot transgress the being-with-others [other subjects] intentionally comprised by m factual being, etc., and thus [I cannot transgress] the absolute reality [of transcendental intersubjectivity]. […] I am [thus] the most primitive fact [the “Urfaktum”] (Hua XV, 385f.)

In Hua XV, Annex XXXII, written on April 17th 1933, Husserl advances to the ultimate consequences of the philosophical position he initiated in 1921: He overturns completely his old ordering of first and second philosophy: “Can I change fictively the world in any other way than by beginning with the world given originally to me, the present world, having a past and a future from out of my present? […] And is it not evident that no world, no fictive world in the freedom of fantasy, is conceivable in which I with my present world (even if it is a fictively transformed present world) do not feature? And does this not imply still more, namely, that no other conceivable world can exist without my factually present being, and therefore also that no other conceivable world can exist without the factually present world? Concerning me and my world, reality precedes every possibility!” (Hua XV, p. 519)

For Husserl in his later years, the result of the first step of the transcendental reduction is not an abstract, solipsistic Cartesian ego, and not, as in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, a universal “I of transcendental apperception” as the condition of the possibility of the unity of experience, but rather my actually existing, concrete ego in its existing intersubjectivity. In Hua XV, text Nr. 5, written about 1930 Husserl says: “I must distinguish the presently transcendentally-phenomenologizing subjectivity (as a real ego, as a monad) from transcendental subjectivity simply; the former shows itself to be transcendent intersubjectivity, including the transcendentally-phenomenologizing subjectivity. (Hua XV, 74f.)

6. Husserl’s Metaphysics

It may be astonishing that during Husserl’s career since very early he became more and more a metaphysician and that his deepest interests were finally in metaphysics. This fact is often not even perceived and one does not even wish to perceive it. Husserl’s metaphysics were close to the monadological metaphysics of Leibniz; one can roughly say that Husserl’s metaphysics are a monadology founded in phenomenology.

Husserl’s earliest text about monadology known to me was written around the year 1908, when Husserl led the foundations of his transcendental
phenomenology. Like in his later texts he considered monadological metaphysics not as a pure result of phenomenology but as a phenomenological interpretation of objective empirical sciences, not as First but as Second Philosophy. In this text, published in Hua XIII as Annex III, Husserl asks: “But does consciousness (Bewusstsein) not arise? Do not bodies arise with always richer psychic lives? Was not once a time without the existence of consciousness? Should we say, that the possibility of natural science requires (as already [Gustav] Fechner and others demanded) that nowhere we can stop with empathy (Einfühlung) and that we must consider every physical as a bodily (leiblich); [is] therefore consciousness everywhere and [have we a] parallelism of the physical and the psychic? That is by no means required; whether this is true or not can only be decided by natural sciences.” In the following, Husserl as a phenomenologist gives a metaphysical interpretation of the physical world: “Development of the world is development of consciousness, and all physical is only a relation between consciousnesses. The essence of consciousnesses is such that in our thinking we have to posit the physical world in the form of the physical matters, forces, atoms and so on. Doing this we have essentially renewed the monadology of Leibniz. And the monad has no windows, the monads stand not under reciprocal influence, but have an universal accord. It makes no sense to want to bring about consciousness by the physical. But changes in the group of appearances ‘physical body x’ in my consciousness signifies a necessary change of the corresponding group of appearances in every consciousness. And part of it is also every [appearing] body (Leib). In this manner, by the physically appearing world, every spirit [monad] has effects on every other. They are in universal accord, they have a connection (Zusammenhang) by fundamental law.” (Hua XIII, Beilage III, p. 7)

In a text written on October 11 1910, Husserl conceives in an interpretation of the theory of evolution in the natural sciences a genetic conception of the monads. I guess that this text from October 11 1910 was written as a preparation for Husserl’s lectures of the winter term of 1910/11: “Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie”, where he extends the phenomenological reduction on intersubjectivity. If I would have known this text when I edited this lecture in Hua XIII, I would have included it as annex in my edition of these lectures. But this text was only published 40 years later in 2014 as Annex XVIII in Hua XLII by Rochus Sowa and Thomas Vongher. I have no time now to present here this very interesting text.

One could already know that Husserl was interested in metaphysics by reading his introduction in Ideas Book I, published in 1913. In this introduction he remarks that the Ideas will contain three books and he says about the content of the third book: “This book will awake the insight, that genuine (echte) philosophy which has to realize the idea of absolute knowledge is rooted in pure phenomenology, and this in a so serious sense, that systematically rigorous foundation and realisation of this first of all philosophies is the necessary precondition for every metaphysic and other philosophy ‘which [in the word of Kant] could present itself as science’.” (Hua III, p. 8)

In the preparations of his Ideas Husserl has never written a single line for this third book. It was a misleading mistake that Marly Biemel called her edition
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of Hua V Ideas, Book three “Drittes Buch”). The text of Hua V (Husserl 1952) has nothing to do with the third Book of the Ideas as it is outlined in the quoted introduction of the First Book, but was written by Husserl as nothing else than the second part of the second Book of Ideas. Perhaps this misleading mistake has also favoured the idea that Husserl did not think about metaphysics.

Now I shall try to say something more about the content of Husserl's metaphysics:

In a text published in Hua XIV as text Nr. 13, written in the beginning of the year 1922 in the context of the preparation of his “new great systematic work,” Husserl gives an outline of his metaphysics (Hua XIV, pp. 256-272). Physical and ideal objects (e.g., pure geometrical forms, numbers, the Ninth Symphony of Beethoven) are of a subordinated dignity of being (“untergeordnete Seinsdignität”) because they are nothing other than unities in regulated progressions of experiences and of intellectual activities of subjects. On the other hand, “of a higher order is the dignity of being of the subjectivity with ego-ego-ogitatum. I leave it open whether it is the ultimate and highest dignity of being. But in any case, the ego is “in itself” and not in something else. […] The ego is for itself. By being, it becomes conscious of itself. […] But it has not only concepts obtained directly from out of itself […] It can also be conceived by another I-subject, making itself known [bekunden sich] in empathic experience.” (Hua XIV, p. 257) “Since I conceive it as another ego, I can reciprocally also make myself known to it. This reciprocity of mutually making-oneself-known is only possible through our embodiment.” (Hua XIV, p. 258). Husserl concludes his lectures on “First Philosophy” of the winter term 1923/24 (published by Rudolf Boehm in 1959 as Hua VIII) with the following sentences: “Unique, absolute being is being as subject [das Subjektsein], being as constituted for itself, and the entire absolute being is the universe of the transcendental subjectivities standing together in real and possible community. In this way phenomenology leads to monadology, anticipated by Leibniz in his ingenious aperçu. (Hua VIII, p. 190)

As in Leibniz' monadology, every ego is a unity (monad). Each has its own flow of consciousness with its objective physical and ideal intentional correlates. However, in opposition to Leibniz, Husserl maintains that “the monads have windows.” Yet he qualifies this claim immediately in a sense making his own monadology conform to that of Leibniz. In the already quoted text published in Hua XIV, as text Nr. 13, written in the context of the preparation of his “new systematic work”, Husserl writes: “They [the monads] have no doors and windows insofar as no other subject can really [reell] enter into a monad. But through the windows (which are acts of empathy) the other subject is experienced just as well as my own past experiences are experienced through remembering[…]. Every monad has not only a nature, but a world together with other animal and human subjects. These other subjects have a body in this world and experience this world, whereby this world is constituted as an identical world for all monads (Hua XIV, pp. 260f.).

In a text published in Hua XV as Annex XXII and written in the second half of October 1931, Husserl says the following concerning the relation
between monads: “The existence of every monad is [intentionally] implicated in every other one. Each has constituted in its “consciousness” the same world. In every monad there is contained “implicitly” every being and, transcendentally, is contained the universe of the monads and everything constituted in the singular monad and constituted in community. On the other hand, the monads are absolutely separated. They have no moment, nothing real [Reelles] in common. They coexist in monadic universal time [in der monadischen Allzeit]. (Hua XV, p. 377).

Leibniz would say that even physical nature is a manifestation of monads; that there are monads everywhere; that there are no other things than monads; that there is no fundamental difference between the physical and the psychical, but only differences of degree; that all monads have an infinity of perceptions that are more or less differentiated, more or less clear. In the already quoted text published in Hua XIV as text Nr. 13 and written in the beginning of 1922 Husserl writes: “There is a difference between the absolute (i.e., the multiplicity of monads), which is presupposed by every possible objective nature, and the objective nature itself, which is a mere correlate of position, a mere constitutive “production [Erzeugnis]” of the totality [of monads], on the basis of pure products of subjective natures, even of different levels, in every single monad.” (Hua XIV, p. 266).

There is a radical difference between Leibniz’ finite monads, seen as different levels of perceptual and appetitive unities. Most of the monads are simply finite perspectives on the world from different points of view, whereas there are also specific monads that reflexively know that they themselves and the other monads are different finite perspectives on the world from different “points of view.” These monads, the human ones, have not only perceptions, but also apperceptions. They are able to contemplate what they are. This corresponds to Husserl’s doctrine of self-reflection and of reflection in empathy, a doctrine I have spoken about in subject Nr. 3, “Husserl’s concept of I consciousness Ichbewusstsein).” Furthermore, we can say not only that this ability of reflection makes these monads self-conscious to a higher degree (or gives them, as Kant would say, borrowing a word from Leibniz, the form of transcendental apperception), but also that this ability permits these monads to be aware that others have their own “points of view.” On the level of ethics, this has practical consequences: The reflective monad, endowed not only with perceptions and appetitions, but also with apperception, is free to will and to choose in one way or in another, and is able in its actions to respect or to not respect others as other “points of view” with their own wills and their own aims and interests.

In a text written in Schluchsee in September 1933 and published as text Nr. 34 in Hua XV, Husserl discusses the teleology of the totality of monads. He speaks in this text of the “infinity of the pre-animal and animal levels of monads right up to the human monads”, on the one hand, and, of “the pre-infantile and infantile monads – in the perpetuity of ontogenetic and phylogenetic development” on the other hand (Hua XV, p. 595).

The teleologically developing totality of monads is at first a community of instinctive drives that ultimately arrives in the human community at the
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consciousness of itself. Husserl continues in the above quoted text written in Schluchsee in September 1933 and published as text Nr. 34 in Hua XV: “This [human community] has a universal world in which it finds itself as cognizing this world and as having ascended to the will to know the world, creating, in the European humanity of culture, universal positive [and mathematical] sciences [of the world]. And from here alone the transcendental reduction is possible, through which the monads are first discovered as human monads, and then all monads in the form of their generative relations.” (Hua XV, p. 596). Husserl stresses at the end of this text that the transcendental phenomenological question, going back to the generative origins of the totality of monads, starts from myself and from the world in which I live concretely and naturally, the life-world of my and our experience. This life-world is at the same time the world of the sciences, which themselves belong to this world.

In a text published in Hua XV as annex XXIII, written on November 13th, 1931 and entitled “Teleology,” Husserl exposits a universal view of the teleological development of the monads: “Every transcendental existence [Dasein], not only in its singleness, but in its intersubjective communication [Vergemeinschaftung], is traversed by a unifying striving for ‘perfection’. It is not by accident that the human being, always occupied with the particulars of experience, of evaluating, of aiming (purposing) in actions, never arrives at satisfaction. Or, more exactly, [it is not by accident] that no satisfaction in something particular and in finitude is real and full satisfaction, and that satisfaction refers to a totality of a life and to a personal totality of being. […] The human being lives in an ‘infinity’, which is the enduring horizon of its life. It transcends the instincts and creates values of a higher level and transcends these values. Every human being finds itself in an infinitely open world of values, that is, a world of practical values that are to be transcended ‘in infinitum’ [.]. […] But all this indicates only the lower level of happiness. The infinity of the life-horizon, as far as it contains the disclosed [erschlossener] infinity of human generations, brings death and fate into the horizon, and the possibility of suicide, also the possibility of an intersubjective ‘suicide’. In the disclosed infinity there is bliss and absurdity. From the beginning, there are no hedonistic values. […]. The values of the person […] have their origin in completely different sources, the sources of love in the strict sense of the word [im prägnanten Wortsinn]. […] Love – losing oneself lovingly in the other, uniting oneself with the other (but not as in the relation between master and slave) – is not at all hedonistic, even though it founds joys, ‘high’ joys”. (Hua XV, pp. 405f.). This text ends with the sentence: “But all of this must be thought through again. Cf. the old manuscripts?” (Hua XV, p. 407). I guess these old manuscripts are the texts on personal and ethical love, written by Husserl in 1921 as preparation of a “new systematical work “ and published in Husserliana XIV as text Nr. 9 under the title “Gemeingeist I”.

What is unique in Husserl’s late monadology, in contrast to the monadology of Leibniz, consists in its strict phenomenological point of view. Husserl’s whole monadology is ultimately centered or rooted in one’s own ego. He writes in a text from 1932 or 1933, published in Hua XV as annex XL: “This ego is unique in an absolute sense, not admitting of a meaningful
multiplication; or, to put it even more acutely, it excludes as meaningless any such multiplication.” (pp. 589f.)

To show Husserl’s fundamental interest in metaphysics, I shall conclude this lecture by quoting a passage from a letter, Husserl has written in 1932 June 3 to his oldest and best friend, the mathematician and physicist Gustav Albrecht. The two friends met each other as students of the mathematician Carl Weierstrass in Berlin between 1878 and 1881. In 1994 this letter was edited by Karl Schummann, together with his wife Elisabeth Schumann, in vol. IX of the Briefwechsel (Husserl 1994). In June 1932, when Husserl wrote this letter, he was occupied again with the preparation of a “great systematic work”, which was never written and in which he planned to give also a sketch of his phenomenologically founded metaphysics. He wrote to Gustav Albrecht: “During the last years my manuscripts grew enormously – during years they grew very fruitful in thoughts. They gave me much light and guided me to a height from which were opened accesses to the very old metaphysical problems. But in a manner that these problems, by the systematic way of my methodical work and thereby by the problematic revealed from the bottom, become problems of rigorous scientific work. […] All sciences are in a crisis of their foundations and of the self-understanding of their method; this self-understanding belongs to their scientific character. […] To this all is related that rigorous science, identified with the sciences of the modern times, stand on the one side and philosophy on the other, that metaphysics are considered as a field of vague speculations or as an empire of fanciful mystic. But metaphysics are fundamentally nothing else than the sciences that give to the world and to humanity the deepest clarification, and in this manner they have as their theme the last, and thereby absolute sense of the world and of humanity. […] The highest of all questions, not comprehensible and not understandable by everyone without difficulties, are the metaphysical questions. They concern birth and death, the last sense of the “I”, and of the “we” objectivated (objektiviert) as humanity, they concern the teleology, which leads back to the transcendental subjectivity and its historicity. And of course these metaphysical problems concern as their highest point: the being of God as the principle of teleology and the sense of the being of God vis-à-vis the being of the first absolute, the being of my transcendental I and of the transcendental all-subjectivity disclosing itself in myself – the true place of the divine activity […] I would like so much to give at least a most general systematic sketch of the problematic from the bottom until the highest point. But how many concrete detailed elucidations, subtle boring elementary [phenomenological] analyses belong to it [to this most general sketch!] (Aber wie viel konkrete Einzel ausführung, subtile langweilige Elementaranalyse gehört dazu)”

Notes
1. The text of this subject 3 was not read in my lecture of December 13 2018
2. Rudolf Boehm, the editor of this text, remarks in a footnote that this text probably dates from 1924. I think the content of this very important text does not fit with Husserl’s plans of 1924 (when he returned to conceiving the transcendental reduction in a Cartesian, egological manner), but rather with his
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plans of 1921/1922 when he conceived a new “great systematic work,” completely different in fundamental points from the Ideas.

References