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Love, On the Univocity of Rawls’s Difference Principle | ||
| مجله پژوهش های فلسفی | ||
| مقاله 5، دوره 17، شماره 45، 1402، صفحه 60-71 اصل مقاله (612.76 K) | ||
| نوع مقاله: مقاله علمی- پژوهشی | ||
| شناسه دیجیتال (DOI): 10.22034/jpiut.2023.17366 | ||
| نویسنده | ||
| Alain Boyer | ||
| Professor of Philosophy Department, Université Paris-Sorbonne, France | ||
| چکیده | ||
| A double ambiguity has been charged against Rawls’s difference principle (DP). Is it Maximin, Leximin, or something else? Usually, following A. Sen, scholars identify DP with the so-called Leximin. One argues here that one has to distinguish 1° the Leximin, 2° the Maximin (as rule of justice formally analogous to the maximin rule of decision), represented by the figure in L of the perfectly substitutable goods, and 3° the genuine DP. When the augmentation of inequality benefits the worse off, only Pareto-strong improvements are permitted. Leximin would also permit Pareto-weak improvements too (after the first maximum D), where only the richest improves: from (2, 3) to (2, 5), say. This is forbidden by DP. With two classes, unlike Maximin, DP has no curve of indifference and is always decisive, as Leximin is. For undecisive Rules of Justice, which admit indifferent curves, I propose to add a lexically secondary rule, to break ties. That move is able to clarify the links and the differences between on the one hand Maximin alone, with its typical indifference curves in L, and on the other hand, the DP properly understood and the Leximin, which both have no indifferent curves. With two classes of persons (best off/worse off), DP appears more egalitarian than Leximin, because it's secondary rule is MinIn (Minimization of Inequality). But the intuition behind the distinction is that it cannot possible “fair” that only the best off improves in a productive social cooperation. | ||
| کلیدواژهها | ||
| utilitarianism؛ maximin؛ leximin؛ difference principle | ||
| مراجع | ||
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Arrow, K. (1983). Collected Papers, Vol. 1, Belknap Press, Harvard University Press. Baumol W. (1977). Economic Theory and Operational Analysis, Prentice Hall International Paperback Editions. Cohen G. A. (2008). Rescuing Justice and Equality, Harvard University Press. D’aspremont & Gevers. (1977). Equity and the Informational Basis of Collective Choice, Review of Economic Studies, 44(2), 199-209. Dworkin, D. (2000). Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality, Harvard University Press, Harsanyi, J. (1953). Cardinal Utility in Welfare Economics and the Theory of Risk-Taking, Journal of Political Economy. Vol. 61, 434 Harsanyi, J. (1982). Morality and the Theory of Rational Behavior, In Utilitarianism and Beyond, Editor by A. Sen, & B. Williams, Cambridge University Press. Nozick, R. (1974). Anarchy, State and Utopia, Basic Books. Phelps, E. (1973). Wage Taxation for Economic Justice. In Economic Justice, Editor by S. Phelps, Ch. 18, Penguin. Parfit, D. (2002). Equality or Priority, In the Ideal of Equality, Editor by M. Clayton & A. Williams, Ch. 5 (Appendix: Rawls’s View.) Palgrave. Pipes R. (1999). Property and Freedom, Vintage Books. Rawls, J. (1999). A Theory of Justice, Oxford University Press. Rawls , J. (2001). Justice as Fairness, a Restatement, Belknap Press. Sandel, M. (1982). Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge University Press. Sen, A. (2017). Collective Choices and Social Welfare, Holden Day. Van Paris, PH. (2003). Difference Principles, In S. Freeman Ed., The Cambridge Companion to Rawls, pp. 200-240, Cambridge University Press. | ||
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