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فهرست نشریات دارای اعتبار وزارت علوم، تحقیقات و فناوری
پایگاه استنادی علوم جهان اسلام (ISC)

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کلانتری, سید علی. (1394). Does the conceptual interdependency of belief and desire undermine the normativity of content?. سامانه مدیریت نشریات علمی, 9(17), 95-103.
سید علی کلانتری. "Does the conceptual interdependency of belief and desire undermine the normativity of content?". سامانه مدیریت نشریات علمی, 9, 17, 1394, 95-103.
کلانتری, سید علی. (1394). 'Does the conceptual interdependency of belief and desire undermine the normativity of content?', سامانه مدیریت نشریات علمی, 9(17), pp. 95-103.
کلانتری, سید علی. Does the conceptual interdependency of belief and desire undermine the normativity of content?. سامانه مدیریت نشریات علمی, 1394; 9(17): 95-103.

Does the conceptual interdependency of belief and desire undermine the normativity of content?

مجله پژوهش های فلسفی
مقاله 5، دوره 9، شماره 17، اسفند 1394، صفحه 95-103    اصل مقاله (441.59 K)
نوع مقاله: مقاله علمی- پژوهشی
نویسنده
سید علی کلانتری*
استادیار گروه فلسفه، دانشگاه اصفهان
چکیده
The normativity of mental content thesis has been very influential in contemporary philosophy of mind. Paul Boghossian (2003, 2005) has developed an argument for the normativity of mental content on the basis of two premises, i.e. firstly, the normativity of the notion of belief and secondly, the priority of the notion of belief to the notion of desire. In his recent article Alexander Miller (2008) has criticised Boghossian’s argument for the normativity of mental content. To make the objection against the normativity of content Miller has argued that the second premise of Boghossian’s argument is false to the effect that belief and desire are conceptually interdependent. My purpose in this paper is to show that content normativity thesis survives Miller's attack. In order to establish the claim I will argue that content is normative even if belief and desire are conceptually interdependent.
کلیدواژه‌ها
normativity؛ belief؛ desire؛ content؛ interdependency
مراجع
  • Bykvist, K. and A. Hattiangadi., (2007), “Does thought imply ought?” Analysis, vol. 67: 277-85.
  • Boghossian, P., (2003), “The Normativity of Content”, Philosophical Issues, vol.13: 31–45.
  • Boghossian, P., (2005), “Is meaning normative?” In Philosophy – Science – Scientific Philosophy, ed. A. Beckermann and C. Paderborn: Mentis.
  • Engel, P., (2001), “Is truth a norm?” In Interpreting Davidson, eds. P. Kotatko et al. Stanford, CA: CSLI Publications.
  • Gibbard, A., (2005), “Truth and Correct Belief.” Philosophical Issues, vol. 15: 338–350.
  • Gibbard, A., (2003), “Thoughts and Norms”, Philosophical Issues, vol. 13: 83–98.
  • Shah, N., (2003), “How Truth Governs Belief”, The Philosophical Review, vol. 112: 447–482.
  • Shah, N. and Velleman, D., (2005), “Doxastic Deliberation”, The Philosophical Review, vol. 114: 497–534.
  • Miller, A., (2008), “Thoughts, oughts and the conceptual primacy of belief”, Analysis, vol. 68: 234–238.
  • Wedgwood, R., (2002), “The Aim of Belief”, Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 16: 276–297.
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