فایده نگری و صداقت: ارزیابی نقد ویلیامز بر فایده نگری

1. Introduction

Proposing the problem of integrity in ethics has normally been along with a claim for some gape in the consequentialist as well as deontologist theories, and has suggested the need for a new type of normative theories, that is, theories which give a more important role to the individual identity and character. Bernard Williams is one of the innovators of the discussion. He started up the dialogue on this subject in his paper on the critique of utilitarianism in Utilitarianism: For and Against. Williams believes that this view requires one’s becoming alienate from the projects and attitudes with which he is most closely identified; thus, it is in the most literal sense, an attack on his integrity. He deals with the criticism of this viewpoint through his objection concerning the principle of impartiality regarded as the essence of morality itself, and his disapproval of the strong doctrine of negative responsibility which he sees as one of the requirements of consequentialism. This paper deals with the assessment of Williams criticism of utilitarianism: firstly examines and analyzes Williams objection about negative responsibility; then posing some objections to his attitude and responding them, along with mentioning some vagueness in his assertion, discusses the urgency of integrity and its moral status; besides, it suspects the basis on which Williams estimates utilitarianism as a ground for one’s alienation from her moral feelings; finally, it checks out if a moral viewpoint must conform to (be consistent with?) sincere personal projects so that integrity will be preserved.

2. Williams’ critique of utilitarianism

The concern of utilitarianism, as a consequential view, is with what state of affairs the world contains, so it involves the notion of negative responsibility, which means that one is just as much responsible for things that one fails to prevent as for things that she brings about. Here, one is responsible for what “in some vital link in the production of the eventual outcome is provided by someone else’s doing something.” This responsibility, according to Williams, is an unlimited one and it requires one to think all the time of the yielded (provided?) outcomes in the world, her own projects having the same burden on her as other’s projects. For Williams, this view implies that one alienates from one’s commitments, and projects identify her, i.e., from her actions and her beliefs; and this is equal to losing her integrity.

3. The assessment of Williams’ critique

This paper, reviewing and analyzing Williams’ critique of negative responsibility, notices us that our actions are always formed and affect in a context of external circumstances of which the actions of other people are also apart, and, in producing the outcome, the agent is always only one of the links; so, there is not such a sharp boundary as Williams represents between negative responsibility and other responsibilities. Moreover, it is not only a negative responsibility that is limitless but tracing a personal project may also be an unlimited responsibility. Therefore, it seems that what makes negative responsibility a different one is some other elements. This paper has detected (discerns?) two factors affecting our responsibility for an action which is done by other’s interference; and argues that the more important and more decisive is the outcome of an action, the agent is more responsible for it. The paper also treats the connection between negative responsibility and the threat of integrity and suspects it in some respects. It also calls into question the basis upon which Williams claims that utilitarianism alienates us from our moral feelings, that is, it refuses that if one performs one’s moral duties, then every bad feeling she would have is out of her moral self; but it holds that, in the course of ethical dilemmas, there is always a feeling of discontent, whose power rests on two factors: closeness of the intensity (degree?) of undesirability of possible choices, and the weight of undesirability of each choice.  

4. Conclusion

Williams’ opposition to utilitarianism reveals to us some subtle and profound points. Nonetheless, his remarks are vague in some parts. Williams’ main concern is essentially about embedding personal features (facts, aspects, factors?) in moral theories. He believes that some of these are projects and attitudes that one may be so identified with them that neglecting them, in any way, would be a kind of threating one’s integrity. However, in addition to objections that can be raised regarding his criticism, the point which remains unclear is whether there is not any possibility for changing one’s commitments and for their adaptation to moral rules. If we could refine or modify, at least in some cases, our projects and adapt them to other established principles, it would be possible that we do not merely ask a moral outlook to be adapted to our interests, but expect personal attitudes to conform themselves to a certain moral criterion.

References

-      Scheffler Samuel (1983) The Rejection of Consequentialism: A Philosophical Investigation of the considerations Underlying Rival Moral Conceptions, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

-      Williams Bernard (1973) “A Critique of Utilitarianism”. In: Smart JJC, Williams Bernard, editors, Utilitarianism for and Against. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 77–150.

-      Bernard, editors (1981c) ‘‘Utilitarianism and Moral Self-Indulgence,’’ in Bernard Williams, Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 40–53.

-      Bernard, editors (1985) Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, London and New York: Routledge.