A New Philosophy of Man and Humanism*

Hans LM Dassen**
Anthropos Foundation Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands

Abstract
The theoretical basis for the new philosophy was laid by the American philosopher James Joseph Dagenais (1923-1981), who came to the conclusion that philosophical anthropology is not a science, but a domain unto itself, and that a philosophy of man can only come about as a joint undertaking of all sciences, in which the object of study must be man himself. The final explanation of man lies outside all possible scientific views that have ever been formulated, because they lie within the origins of every branch of science, including the science of philosophy. It is the final ground on which the philosophies, of any nature whatsoever, can be practised implicitly or explicitly. The methods of a post-modern philosophical anthropology will have to be based on reflection, on the claim that it is possible to debate differences and contrasts on reasonable grounds, and on the individual responsibility for the decisions we all make for ourselves in respect of changes in body and mind. A post-modern version of Sartre’s creed: man is and always will be what he makes of himself. I have given philosophical anthropology a new concrete substance on the basis of the definition of Jim Dagenais: “a consistent overall vision of man and his world”, so that it can serve as the basis for philosophy and thus as the foundation for human life.

Key words: Philosophy, anthropology, domain unto itself, interdisciplinary, reflection

* Received date: 2018/6/23  Acception date: 2018/9/17

** Hans L.M. Dassen LL.M., Dutch philosopher and member of the Advisory and Editorial Board, as well as National delegate of the Netherlands of the UNESCO e-magazine for culture and philosophy Philosophical Views & Thomson Reuters.
Email: mrjlmdashsen@hotmail.com
“The only claims which philosophy can make to leadership in the total enterprise of understanding man is its capacity to explicate its own presuppositions… if the necessary presuppositions of a philosophy of man can be clarified and justified, its claim to be basic can be validated… The presuppositions of any philosophy, I maintain, involve a fundamental attitude towards myself, the other, and the world. The most fundamental evidence here is that the universe is not a thing, nor even a system of things, not an object or a system of objects, but primordially an interpersonal world, a world of and for persons.

Philosophy can then be defined as a reflection upon the pre-reflexive, pre-philosophical, pre-scientific experiencing of being, that is, upon experiencing before any kind of conscious thematization. If philosophy is a radical and transcendental thinking, that is, a thinking upon the a priori conditions of possibility of all thinking and all experiencing, then the experiencing which is reflected upon must be experiencing in the largest sense. It is the experiencing in my insertion of being – concretely, the experiencing of myself and the other in the world.” (James Joseph Dagenais 1923-1981)²

1. Philosophical Anthropology: a consistent overall vision of man and his world.
This definition can largely be derived from a study of the basic tenets of the relationship between philosophy and the sciences, in particular the philosophy of man and the social sciences in Models of Man, A Phenomenological Critique of Some Paradigms in the Human Sciences by Jim Dagenais³, from which, in a nutshell, the following hypotheses are borrowed:

“The thesis maintained is that the human sciences, as sciences, must attempt to reduce the meaning of man to the control of the scientific presuppositions which found each science, and that, in consequence, each scientific model can and must pretend to universal exclusiveness. Furthermore, since each science must be limited to one perspective, they cannot all be summed up under the control of another science, such as philosophy. This amounts to saying that the sciences (positive, axiomatic, or humanistic) must be autonomous as sciences; that the only critique of them as
A new philosophy of man and humanism /203

Dagenais then gives three possible answers to the question “… how we know human being…”, of which he explicitly chooses the second one:

“First, … through the sciences of man….. But, again, each of these sciences is autonomous and independent… Second, we might hypothesize that we know man through a “definition” of man. But then the elaboration of an all-encompassing theory about human being would have to depend upon all the empirical sciences anyway. Otherwise it would have only the apodicticity of a logically necessary statement. That is, if it is to be about real human beings, such a theory will have to depend upon a host of extra-systematic assumptions which will serve only to invalidate the supposed logical consistency of the argument. Third, … through a prestructured “metaphysical system” of the whole….. This really makes the sciences of man unnecessary and gratuitous, and explains nothing about the origin of the system in any case.”

Ultimately he comes to the conclusion that “[i]n all these inadequate hypotheses there is one recognizable constant: that all understanding of human being in the world, whether scientific or philosophical, is founded upon a pre-scientific and pre-philosophical experiencing of human beings as self-and-other-in-the-world. The only alternative, then, is a critical explicitation of this experiencing; and that is the task of philosophy. It is the task undertaken in this essay, especially in the important and basic defense of the second phase of the thesis stated above.”

He describes “the present status of philosophical anthropology” as follows:

“It is difficult to write on a subject which hardly exists, except in the spirits of its practitioners. In the English-speaking world there are no Chairs of Philosophical Anthropology, and courses with the title are rare. The philosopher, it seems, has some reason to expect the accusation poaching in the fields of the “true” anthropologist, or economist, or what-have-you, since he shares the data of their sciences with them.

The notion of a philosophical anthropology did not spring into existence suddenly, without antecedents. The subject is an outgrowth of what used to be called, in some circles, ‘philosophical psychology’, and more recently, ‘the
philosophy of man’. Philosophical psychology was an outgrowth of the Scholastic enterprise of ‘rational psychology’, a manual treatment of the peculiarly epistemological and psychological works of Thomas Aquinas (for example, the treatise of de Veritate, or the commentaries upon Aristotle’s de Anima). In the course of time, the manuals were retouched, reorganized or remodeled, keeping the basic Aristotelian and Thomistic orientation, together, often, with the Kantian-Thomistic synthesis of Maréchal. Lonergan, Coreth, Rahner, Lotz and Donceel, among others, have been the guiding lights of this movement in modern times; but the movement, with all its accretions, its growing respect for ‘existentialism’ and ‘phenomenology’, its increasing abandonment of antiquated terminology, still searches for ‘what makes man properly man’, perhaps for an ‘essence’.

But in the context of the ‘philosophia perennis’, in which essence is constituted through genus and specific difference, the old definition of man as ‘rational animal’ no longer suffices, and the effort at explicating the definition with the help of modern scientific experimentation succeeds only in demonstrating the inadequacy of the original definition. For example, Joseph Donceel’s completeness and universality; any knowledge that we might have of ‘man’ outside of the knowledge that we have of him in any of these sciences is simply ‘unscientific’ from the point of view of the science involved. The option of the present book is that the final explanation of ‘man’ lies outside [emphasis added by author] of all the possible scientific views of him because it lies within the origins of any and all the sciences, including the science of philosophy.”

“The currently fashionable models of man appear to some to be reductivist (the ‘nothing but” type of explanation); but, in fact, we cannot expect them to be anything else. Such models, through their own coherence and rigor of the methods which in their elaboration, make a claim to ultimacy, and we had to take them seriously. It is difficult to impress the importance of this view upon beginners in philosophy; we owe to Edmund Husserl, in his operation of the ‘transcendental reduction’, and his ‘bracketing of the world of the natural attitude’, the sole possibility we have of bringing to consciousness the realization that we possess a non-scientific pre-knowledge of our world and of ourselves which we are explicating through our objective scientific endeavors. Without the transcendental focus, such consciousness would simply ‘go without saying’, and we would never have explicit knowledge that there is the possibility of reflection”, (4)
“and consequently, the ‘objective view’ of the universe which we have scientifically would be the only one possible.

There is, then, a series of questions which must be answered here, or at least a series of problems which must be clearly distinguished. The first question is one of perspective. It was said above that ‘many sciences study man’. Traditionally speaking, each of these sciences chooses a perspective which constitutes the ‘formal object’ of the science in question. There is thus one clue provided for the success of the enterprise of philosophical anthropology: there is only one object, properly speaking, the ‘material object’, man himself. But the initial problem also arises here; a material object cannot be studied ‘in itself’, but only under the modality of some formal perspective. Consequently, to carry out the implications of the task, it seems that one must add that this one object should be treated from all possible points of view. True enough, and that will make the enterprise a truly interdisciplinary one.”(4) “However, one must be careful not to reintroduce incoherence through eclecticism, that is, by adopting simultaneously incompatible or contradictory points of view. This, in my opinion, is the heart of the problem, and the precise fault of the ‘human sciences’, taken as an agglomerate today.

… it may be true that an ‘object’ (of study) is the sum total, or total structure, of all possible perspectives upon it …

Is it, then, possible, as an alternative problematic, to lay the groundwork for a philosophy of man which can, in turn, serve as a groundwork for the sciences of man by uncovering the vectors determining the horizon within which the data are accessible? Such a project is indeed possible, since, in any case, philosophical presuppositions (unexplicated evidence) lie at the origin of all sciences. But the assertion of this possibility carries a proviso: Provided philosophy itself be included in the class of sciences obliged to clarify their own presuppositions and to justify them. If philosophers can be clear about their own presuppositions, and justify them, they shall have a coherent basis upon which to launch a critical study of the various claims to define man … the basic presuppositions of such a philosophy of man … may … serve as a unifying ‘point of view’ which informs all the perspectives upon man without compromising the methodologies and formal aspects proper to each one.

… presuppositions … unreflected or forgotten evidences … philosophy is best equipped to achieve some clarity about its own presuppositions….. perhaps ‘option’ is the best word to use when choosing a perspective for philosophy, and ‘attitude’ is the best term for its method. The option… is that a philosophy of man, a ‘philosophical anthropology’, is the only [one] relevant today.
The only claims which philosophy can make to leadership in the total enterprise of understanding man is its capacity to explicitate its own presuppositions… the foundation of science is always relative to the science in question, and not to any ultimate or absolute foundation; the latter is found only through an investigation of the ultimate sources of all knowledge. Thus, if the necessary presuppositions of a philosophy of man can be clarified and justified, its claim to be basic can be validated…. The presuppositions of any philosophy, I maintain, involve a fundamental attitude towards myself, the other, and the world. The most fundamental evidence here is that the universe is not a thing, nor even a system of things, not an object or a system of objects, but primordially an interpersonal world, a world for and of persons. The problem of these persons is that they have constituted a world of objects and then have forgotten the act of constitution. In our world of technological objectivity, the human person, as the originator of objectivity, has become confused with his own creation. Our inability to remember our act of creation is coterminous with our inability to remember having forgotten. The main point… then, is an effort to remember, perhaps by negation more than by affirmation, what are the ineffaceable bench marks of our passage through the world in which persons are in communication.

Regarding ‘myself’: … the Ego as an originator of the totality of the significance of the personal and natural world. Now, however, it is clear that ‘I’ (the ‘I’ of the ‘Cogito’) cannot be the starting point in philosophical investigation. Both the presuppositionless beginning and the absolute beginning implied in ‘my’ being the starting-point of philosophy are impossible. The absolute beginning involves the question, ‘Can I know anything?’….. The response… consists in returning to what is thought to be the least contestable minimum of affirmation as a starting-point in philosophy, and implies one or other variation of the cogito argument. (St. Augustine used it even before Descartes.)

Heidegger, in our time, has traced the history of the failure of the absolute beginning of a philosophy which asserts that the primordial evidence in human knowledge is ‘I think’, and the illusory conclusion, ‘therefore I am’. ‘I am’ is precisely not an epistemological statement nor a logical conclusion, for it is the very presupposition of one’s thinking. The primordial reference to ‘I am’ as an ontological statement rather than to ‘I think’ as an epistemological statement is, then, a first step. A second step is to ask where precisely, I am. Heidegger’s apparently simple answer is that I am simply ‘there’; and this is the beginning of his ontological analysis of how it is that I am there, and what is the mode of my being there….. The impossibility of an absolute beginning entails the impossibility of a
presuppositionless beginning, since we can at least recognize the primordial reference to being in all knowledge and affirmation…..

Philosophy can then be defined as a reflection upon the pre-reflexive, pre-philosophical, pre-scientific experiencing of being, that is, upon experiencing before any kind of conscious thematization. If philosophy is a radical and transcendental thinking, that is, a thinking upon the a priori conditions of possibility of all thinking and all experiencing, then the experiencing which is reflected upon must be experiencing in the largest sense. It is the experiencing in my insertion of being – concretely, the experiencing of myself and the other in the world.

Now that the discussion has returned to the level of metaphysical presuppositions (options), we might reflect upon the ‘we are’ in relation to ‘the world’. This is the third panel in the triptych of necessary presuppositions in the philosophy of man.

Here, some care will be necessary in order to be clear: for epistemologically the reader may be tempted to fall back into a sterile nineteenth-century idealist position and ‘construct’ the world, and psychologically and ethically to espouse a current and popular ‘existentialism’ in which the creation of the universe can be an arbitrary matter. There is something to be said for both these points of view, however, provided that something is said with discretion. The present proposal is to define human consciousness, with Husserl, not as a thing but as a giver of meaning, and to define man in a preliminary way not as a ‘rational animal’ but essentially project and as incarnate freedom.” (cf. my Core Concepts, Essential (Relative Freedom)) “The intention in doing so is to surpass both idealism and existentialism by subjected both consciousness and project to a reality principle, and to make an incorporation of the non-voluntary and the non-sense (or contradiction and alienation) in the human situation an essential part of the incarnation of human liberty. The questions, ‘Are we completely free?’ and ‘Are we utterly determined?’ are both nonsense. The meaning given to the world is thus man’s meaning and the creation of the world by man is the creation of a human universe, in the sense of both a community of human persons and a human landscape.” (cf. Michael Frayn (5)). “The ‘we are’, then, who are in the world to begin with, find our meaning already in the world; and we define our project as part of an emergent humanity. With this perspective, I think, the de facto intention of both project and emergence can be determined (I do not say it is an easy task!), and deviations from the hopes incarnated in the project, whether due to fault or fallibility, can be uncovered.” (cf. my Core Concepts) “There are theological and ethical corollaries to this thesis, which may be set aside for future elaboration; the main corollary in this context is epistemological, indicating that knowledge,
as well as behavior, is primarily social in character. The empiricist tabula rasa is both unfruitful and misleading, belonging to a context in which absolute beginnings were thought possible.” (cf. my Core Concepts, Relational (Absolute Freedom))

2. Humanism: a philosophy of man championed by Jaap van Praag (1911-1981) and Reinout Bakker (1920 – 1987), both following the footsteps of Dagenais Jaap van Praag

What Jim Dagenais put forward in his Models of Man had been expressed in broad lines in Jaap van Praag’s earlier inaugural speech on humanism as endowed professor of humanism and anthropology of humanism at Leiden University on behalf of the Socrates Foundation of the Dutch Humanist League in 1965:6

“We might perhaps best characterize humanism by pointing to the attitude of mind that precedes all theory and practice. The term attitude of mind comprises an element of mental orientation, of awareness of duty. This is where all that which is shared in humanism resides: being seized of a fundamental truth of life; adopting this starting point that goes before every philosophy, or world view, or attitude to life. A person may hold a certain view, but an attitude of mind characterises a person’s being. Together with the representation of human beings and the world, which have their origins in this starting point, it constitutes man’s philosophy of life. A philosophy of life, then, is a complex of representations for which a particular attitude of mind is the starting point for a world view and a view of man.

Humanistics involves reasoning through the humanist philosophy of life itself. It contemplates a philosophical pursuit. However, it must do justice to the many and varied philosophical interpretations of humanism, which in itself is also remarkably multiform. And so it will come down to uncovering, wherever possible, the elements that make up the core of all humanism….. In other words: it is a search for the underlying tenets of humanism. And humanistics involves reasoning through the humanist philosophy of life from a phenomenological point of view.”7

In his farewell lecture in 1979 (6) he put this in more concrete terms in the following formulation, which is based in part on the text of Dagenais, primarily concerning “the final explanation of 'man’”: “In an instructive book, a certain Dagenais attempted to investigate how the scientific models
A new philosophy of man and humanism /209

of man related to psychology and sociology; he started with Wundt and Durkheim as representatives of the ‘objective’ and Brentano and Weber as representatives of the ‘subjective’ school of thought. ‘The option of the present book’, he wrote, ‘is that the final explanation of “man” lies outside [emphasis added by author] of all the possible scientific views of him because it lies within the origins of any and all the sciences, including the science of philosophy.’ (4) ‘If it now appears that the philosophy of man, even cleansed of its dogmas, cannot work without presuppositions, then after all philosophy is best equipped to achieve some clarity as to his own presuppositions. In this final analysis, perhaps “option” is the best word to use when choosing a perspective for philosophy, and “attitude” is the best term for its method.’ And with these quotations we are back at our starting point: the foundations of thinking about man in his world”, which are “… the mental attitudes and the postulated models of them” (cf. my Core Concepts) … “that can serve as orientation patterns”, of which “the constructive capacity can become apparent: their capacity to appreciate and to criticize starting positions, for example in the sciences” (cf. my Dialogues 1-7). “This seems to me to be a task of philosophical anthropology as well. Philosophical anthropology can thus be of service to the entire range of knowledge of a university.”

Reinout Bakker

In his reflections on philosophical anthropology, Reinout Bakker nowhere refers directly to Jim Dagenais. However, he does refer twice to Jaap van Praag: in his Wijsgerige antropologie van de twintigste eeuw (4) and his farewell speech (4), in which he included verbatim part of a quote from Dagenais cited by Van Praag, particularly in relation to “the final explanation of man”:

In the introduction to the first part he gives the following explication:

‘I just used the term ‘view of man’. It is impossible to avoid giving a provisional and broad description of what, in my view, is the essence of anthropology, a sort of working hypothesis, which must be tested over and over again using the research questions of this century. It reads: Philosophical anthropology is a part of philosophical thought that deals with the question of man, man as a unity of body, soul and mind, man in relation to himself, the other, society, the world and God. It cannot be practiced without the help of human sciences such as psychology, educational theory and sociology: in short, it can only be discussed in an interdisciplinary sense. It should be pointed out that philosophical anthropology must be distinguished from
other forms of anthropology, such as biological and cultural anthropology. They will be discussed now and then in this study because they show a good deal of overlap with philosophical anthropology. But what defines the character of philosophical anthropology in comparison to the other forms is the specific fact that it takes its theme and seeks that which constitutes our typical human being-ness in statements that are presumed to be true and accepted as taken for granted in man’s knowledge by biological and cultural anthropology as well as by many sciences. Because of this, philosophical anthropology is a domain unto itself, and cannot be replaced by any other anthropology. In other words: the final explanation of man lies outside all possible scientific views of man that have ever been formulated, because it lies within the origins of every branch of science, including the science of philosophy. ‘Philosophical anthropology is neutral’, according to Van Praag, ‘in that it does not aim to defend a dogma and even less to serve as propaganda for a conviction, but it can scrutinize its own convictions and starting points as well as those of other disciplines, although here a person’s own conviction inevitably remains his starting point.”

“It is for this reason that I tend to regard philosophical anthropology as a sort of transcendental philosophy because it is the final ground on which the philosophies, of any nature whatsoever, can be practiced implicitly or explicitly.”

In his farewell speech (4) he summarized the entire complex of factors that constitute philosophical anthropology:

“... philosophical anthropology is a domain unto itself, and cannot be replaced by any other anthropology. The final explanation of man lies outside all possible scientific views that have ever been formulated, because they lie within the origins of every branch of science, including the science of philosophy. It is the final ground on which the philosophies, of any nature whatsoever, can be practised implicitly or explicitly (see R. Bakker. Wijsgerige antropologie van de twintigste eeuw. Assen, 2 1982, 3; cf. J. van Praag Levensovertuiging, filosofie en wetenschap, 1979). In my inaugural speech of 25 January 1965 I spoke of the necessary collaboration between philosophy and science.
Philosophy without contact with the empirical sciences is empty, but also: the empirical sciences are blind without the contribution of philosophy. If one of these two poles is made absolute, the danger of gross one-sidedness, or even distortion, is imminent. The fact that the ultimate questions about man are so rarely asked stems from the practice of giving the scientific foundation of philosophy an absolute status. Many phenomenologists and existentialists have warned against such scientism...

The methods of a post-modern philosophical anthropology will have to be based on reflection, on the claim that it is possible to debate differences and contrasts on reasoned grounds, and on the individual responsibility for the decisions we all make for ourselves in respect of changes in body and mind. A post-modern version of Sartre’s creed: man is and always will be what he makes of himself.”

3. Dagenais and Chan-fai Cheung

“Max Scheler, in his Man’s Place and Nature, maintains that there are three most fundamental ideas of man in Western history: man is understood as a rational animal in the Greek philosophy of Plato and Aristotle; as a creature created by God in His image from the Jewish-Christian tradition, and finally as the recent product of animal evolution. In traditional Chinese culture, the dominant ideas of man may be limited to two: the Confucian moral man and the Daoist natural man. Taking the two traditions as a whole, we have therefore two more basic ideas of man to be added to Scheler’s list: in addition to the philosophical, the theological and the scientific, there are the moral and finally the natural (Daoist) man. These ideas cannot be all true since they are in fact incompatible with one another in their fundamental philosophical tenets. There is simply no unified idea of man. Here is where Heidegger’s critique comes in. Although his “phenomenological destruction” of the metaphysics is only directed to the Western tradition, his critique of the metaphysical basis of the very conception of the human nature is, in my opinion, trans-cultural”, in the words of Dr. Cheung Chan Fai, emeritus professor of philosophy at the Chinese University of Hong Kong in his Human Nature and Human Existence – On the Problem of the Distinction Between Man and Animal.”
After he establishes what Heidegger “has written in Chapter 9 of Being and Time: ‘The “essence” (Wesen) of Dasein lies in its existence (Existenz)’, his final opinion is that “the major issue is to understand what human being is. Any metaphysical distinction of man drawn from a comparison between man and animals does not really think of man as man in his Being. ‘Metaphysics thinks of man on the basis of animalitas and does not think in the direction of his humanitas’”, citing Heidegger’s Letter on Humanism: “[t]he essentia (Wesen) of man does not point to the substantia, the whatness, in man. Wesen means the disclosing process of the understanding of Being (Seinsverständnis) in the human Dasein. ‘Wesen’ – essence – in this sense refers not to the what but the how of Dasein with respect to its ‘existence’. The comparison of Aristotle with Xunzi and with Mencius is to show the similar approaches to the question of man, though the two great Confucians place the primacy of the human nature on the moral awareness and its actualization. These two ideas from Aristotle and the Confucians have been the most important for all subsequent theories of man. Heidegger’s philosophy has changed all these. The distinction of man from animals should not be sought in human nature but in the meaning of human existence in the light of Being.”

The distinction between man and animals as the basis for his study and his invocation of the biological anthropologist Max Scheler immediately earns him some measured criticism from Reinout Bakker (4): “Scheler did not see that philosophical anthropology is an integrational philosophical discipline, in which metaphysics must be consistently excommunicated from the mind. Because it is not useful in a scientific sense … the study of man in comparison with animals, prominent in the first half of this century, no longer yields up any meaningful results. The ‘added value’ of man is not expressed in this comparative study. The required empirical method cannot respond to this factor, because it cannot be tested empirically….. And how can one in fact start from a comparison between man and animals if the particular character of the actual comparison is not assessed at the same time? If one wishes to demonstrate that man is fundamentally superior to animals, then one must assume that this can only be proved by means
of reflections of man on himself, reflections on the basis of
which man is aware of himself as an ‘I’ that can study both
himself and animals.”

In respect of Dagenais’s *Models of Man* (3) Cheung remarks: “There are
indeed many more different theories of man not only within philosophy but
also in modern social sciences. Sociology, psychology and anthropology all
propose different empirical theories of man, in contrast to the speculative
ideas in philosophy. The modern discipline of philosophical anthropology
is devoted to the synthesis of speculative and empirical theories”, only to
conclude that “[t]he arguments between all these theories of human nature
seem to rest on the justification of the primordiality of the human essence
in question.” Even after a comprehensive discussion of Max Scheler’s *Spirit
and Person*, he again reaches the conclusion that “[t]here is still no unified
theory of man”. This naturally also applies to the solution which he has
chosen, namely “… the meaning of human existence in the light of Being”
as the basis for “the distinction of man from animals”.

But if we sever the link between these two, then what we retain is “…
the meaning of human existence in the light of Being”, which is precisely
what Dagenais says at the end of his essay, where he cites Husserl: “The
present proposal is to define human consciousness, with Husserl, not as a
thing but as a giver of meaning, and to define man in a preliminary way not
as a ‘rational animal’ but as essentially project and as incarnate freedom.”
(cf. my Core Concepts, Essential (Relative Freedom)) They thus take
different paths to arrive at the same conclusion, the difference being that
Dagenais adds an essential element, incarnate freedom, of which he gives a
comprehensive explanation, which is the answer to the question of “what
makes man properly man”, as described in his *Models of Man*.

In this work, Dagenais laid the theoretical foundation for a new
philosophy of man, or philosophical anthropology, but he also explicitly
said that it needed to be elaborated in a practical (i.e. concrete) sense: “With
this perspective, I think, the de facto intention of both project and
emergence can be determined (I do not say it is an easy task!), and
deviations from the hopes incarnated in the project, whether due to fault or
fallibility, can be uncovered.” (my Core Concepts)
Notes

1. Philosophy as the basis for a humanist ideology: My philosophical anthropology, as opposed to Jaap van Praag’s Foundations of Humanism (6), presents itself as a basis for a humanist ideology, which makes the prevailing concept in humanist circles, ‘humanism without religion’, completely obsolete. Although humanism arose in the 20th century out of an anti-religious movement, a humanism without the religions is incomplete, and so it is not entitled to lay claim to that concept, because as an anti-religious movement it can have no independent significance; it is derived from religions, the role of religions within the humanist movement has always led to heated discussions, and agreement has never been reached on this aspect.

Shouldn’t we start examining the words ‘religiosity’ and ‘religion’ in advance before trying to prove the existence of God, because what is behind those words first of all could be considered as a human emotion, namely the deepest desire for unity (breaking out of isolation) and secondly as a mystery, to be defined by every culture in its own way (relevance: diverse and equal), so that we can perhaps build a bridge between the world’s religions?

Religiosity (in a broad sense, spirituality, mysticism, etc.) of human beings as absolute entities is a matter that takes place on the playing field of the illusion and should therefore be regarded as strictly personal. If people turn their religious feelings into a religion (in a narrow sense), then we may speak of permanence in their communication, set down in books, in which its evolution and history and meaning are described, thus providing it with a certain legitimacy as a religion. Some religions go even further in this respect by creating a wide range of societal institutions such as churches and organisations that provide social services (in a broad sense), so as to anchor themselves in society. See also Ninian Smart, The World’s Religions, 2011, ISBN 978-0-521-63748-0

2. Tallon A., Williams P., 1982, Memorial Minutes James Joseph Dagenais 1923-1981, Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, Vol. 56, No. 2, (Nov., 1982), pp. 253-255, Published by American Philosophical Association, Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3131239: “James J. Dagenais was born in Blue Island, Illinois, in 1923, attended St. Ignatius High School in Chicago, and upon graduation entered the Society of Jesus to begin the fifteen years of spiritual exercises, academic studies, and practical training geared toward production of that enigmatic figure, shrouded in legend (to believe Rene Fulop-Miller) of power and secrecy – the Jesuit. Among his early academic achievements: an M.A. in philosophy from Loyola University (Chicago), with a thesis on “Kierkegaard and Belief”; a Licentiate in Theology from West Baden College (Indiana), with a study on “Some Christou in Pauline Texts”. Next came a break from the studies as he moved to the other side of the desk to teach for several years at the University of Detroit High School, after which Jim went to Louvain University (Leuven, Belgium). At the Institut Supérieur de Philosophie Jim entered fully into the best continental program of graduate philosophical studies available, becoming a committed member of the phenomenological movement, while also taking advantage of Louvain’s proximity to Paris, where at Nanterre and the Sorbonne there was available a full-spirited complement to the Belgian approach,
with its many and thorough courses; in particular Jim spent a considerable amount of time with Paul Ricoeur. In 1966, having completed his Docteur en Philosophie – his dissertation was a phenomenological critique of the work of Carl Rogers – he accepted appointment to the Department of Religion at Miami University (Oxford, Ohio).

At Miami Jim’s life took a major turn as he left the Jesuits soon after arriving at Oxford and married Francoise Monnoyer de Galland. Francoise, a native of Belgium, a psychologist, and a person whose instant presence, quiet cultivation, and deep spirituality immediately and permanently impress all who meet her, shared Jim’s broad academic interests and political involvements. We all can remember what those mid and late sixties were like nationally. At Miami Jim was especially concerned in that troubled era to promote communication between the increasingly polarized faction in the Oxford community and publicly expressed his dismay over the breakdown of mutual understanding which his own school of philosophy sought to promote. He attempted more than once to serve as a bridge-builder, as in team-teaching “Dimensions of Dialogue” at Miami and in his initiative in convening the “Conference on the Epistemological Relationships between Sciences and the Humanities” at Miami in 1975 and 1976, a series of meetings still exerting influence far beyond the Miami campus.”


4. Bakker R., 1984, *Studia in honorem Reinout Bakker*, presented by the Centrale Interfaculteit Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, ed. B. Delfgaauw, H. Hubbeling, W. Smith, (farewell speech): “Can philosophical anthropology still exist? … philosophical anthropology is a domain unto itself, and cannot be replaced by any other anthropology. The final explanation of man lies outside all possible scientific views that have ever been formulated, because they lie within the origins of every branch of science, including the science of philosophy. It is the final ground on which the philosophies, of any nature whatsoever, can be practised implicitly or explicitly.

… In my inaugural speech of 25 January 1965 I spoke of the necessary collaboration between philosophy and science. Philosophy without contact with the empirical sciences is empty, but also: the empirical sciences are blind without the contribution of philosophy. If one of these two poles is made absolute, the danger of gross onesidedness, or even distortion, is imminent. The fact that the ultimate questions about man are so rarely asked stems from giving the scientific foundation an absolute status. Many phenomenologists and existentialists have warned against such scientism.

… The methods of a post-modern philosophical anthropology will have to be based on reflection, on the claim that it is possible to debate differences and contrasts on reasonable grounds, and on the individual responsibility for the decisions we all make for ourselves in respect of changes in body and mind. A post-modern version of Sartre’s creed: man is and always will be what he makes of himself.”
Philosophical anthropology explains how human beings are put together without delving into their cultural characteristics and without moralising. All works on philosophical anthropology and humanism published thus far adopt a moralising tone; they give a blueprint for how people should live without going in any depth into how people are put together and how they operate in their dealings with others. Immanuel Kant’s ‘Anthropologie’, published in 1800, already shows this tendency; so does ‘Brief über den Humanismus’ by Martin Heidegger from 1947. In the second half of the 20th century a number of attempts were made to describe philosophical anthropology and humanism, but without lasting results. Moralising continued to predominate, for example in work of Jaap van Praag, Dutch humanist and professor of philosophy at Leiden University (1994, 1978) and Ad Peperzak, a Dutch professor of philosophy at Loyola University in Chicago, Illinois (1972 and 1975). But a philosophical anthropology must first describe the foundations of human existence without moralising before it can serve as a basis for a humanist life stance.”

An exception to this is found in the work of the biological anthropologists Plessner, Scheler and Gehlen, but their findings also earn them the well-considered and conclusive criticism of Reinout Bakker:

“Reviewing the anthropologists discussed, then we see that biology as an empirical science is an inadequate way of interpreting human beings. The three thinkers leave behind remnants that cannot be divvied up over purely scientific categories.

Plessner centres his anthropology around the eccentricity of human beings, a category that defies empirical investigation. A comparison of humans to animals is not very productive because human beings are always the subject of the comparison” and “Scheler did not see that philosophical anthropology is an integrational philosophical discipline, in which metaphysics must be consistently excommunicated from the mind.

Because it is not useful in a scientific sense the study of man in comparison with animals, prominent in the first half of the 20th century, no longer yields up any meaningful results. The ‘added value’ of man is not expressed in this comparative study. The required empirical method cannot respond to this factor, because it cannot be tested empirically. And how can one in fact start from a comparison between man and animals if the particular character of the actual comparison is not assessed at the same time? If one wishes to demonstrate that man is fundamentally superior to animals, then one must assume that this only can be proved by means of reflections of man on himself, reflections on the basis of which man is aware of himself as an ‘I’ that can study both himself and animals.”

Fresco M.F., 1988, endowed chair, Centrale Interfaculteit Rijksuniversiteit Leiden, Levensberichten, Reinout Bakker, Minnertsga, the Netherlands, 2 November 1920 – Spain 25 March 1987

5. Frayn M., 2006, The Human Touch, Our Part in the Creation of a Universe, ISBN 978-0-571-23217-8 and ISBN 978-0-571-23217-5: “There is no such thing as free will (brain study has shown that a decision has already been taken half a
second before we become aware of it), language proves to be ambiguous and consciousness … is still a huge riddle. Even the laws of nature are no more than human artefacts, the product of the way in which we perceive the universe. In short, all structure that we ascribe to the world arises from our own observation of it.”

(book review by Rob van den Berg in NRC Handelsblad of 8 December 2006 (www.nrc.nl) [Het heelal zit in ons hoofd, Zin en onzin over mens, aarde en kosmos]).


Van Praag J.P., 1979, Levensovertuiging, filosofie en wetenschap, Farewell lecture at Leiden University, 13 November 1979 (www.human.nl)


7. Gasenbeek B., Brabers J., Kuijiman W., The intentions and draft policy plans expressed in Een huis voor humanisten: het Humanistisch Verbond (1946-2006) are fully in line with this (www.human.nl)

8. Roessler B., December 2005, Humanisme en Religie, Tijdschrift voor Humanistiek, Vol. 6, No. 24, : “Should a humanism that is open to criticism really have a religious dimension, an inexplicable rest that forms the foundation of our existence? In my opinion, no.” (www.human.nl)

9. Cheung Chan Fai, B.A., M.Phil. (CUHK), Dr. phil. (Freiburg, Germany), emeritus professor of philosophy at the Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK)


References
- Bakker R., (1984), Studia in honorem Reinout Bakker, presented by the Centrale Interfaculteit Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, ed. B. Delfgaauw, H. Hubbeling, W. Smith,
- Roessler B., December (2005), Humanisme en Religie, Tijdschrift voor Humanistiek, Vol. 6, No. 24,
- Van Praag J.P., (1965), *Wat is humanistiek*? Rede, uitgesproken bij de aanvaarding van het ambt van bijzonder hoogleraar vanwege de humanistische Stichting Socrates in de humanistiek en de antropologie van het humanisme bij de Rijksuniversiteit Leiden, 21 mei 1965 [Inaugural speech, 21 May 1965 (www.human.nl)]