Gilles Deleuze: Beyond Peirce's Semiotics

Golnaz Manteghi Fasayi
PhD Student of Philosophy of Art,
Islamic Azad University, Science and Research Branch, Tehran

Musa Akrami (corresponding author)*
Associate Professor, Faculty of Theology and Philosophy,
Islamic Azad University Science and Research Branch, Tehran

Abstract
This paper studies the role of the semiotic discussions of Charles Sanders Peirce, the American philosopher and mathematician, in the formation of Deleuze's first leading book on cinema, Cinema 1: the Movement-Image, in which the author surpasses Peirce's semiotics. We will show how Deleuze creates a new form of signs in his second leading book on cinema, Cinema 2: the Time-Image. Deleuze had tried to couple the patterns of Peirce's semiotics in his first book with the philosophical discussions on different epochs of the classical cinema. In his second book, he tried to surpass Peirce's semiotics, proposing patterns of new semiotics concerning modern cinema by modeling on Peirce's semiotics. This paper attempts to propose the Peircian signs in Cinema 1: the Movement-Image and Deleuze's modeling on the signs in Cinema 2: the Time-Image, showing that such a surpassing for Deleuze is the key point of understanding philosophy. It helps him to reach his particular semiotics based on both Peirce semiotics and Bergson's philosophy of time, while being completely different from them: noosign.

Keywords: Categories, Chronosign, Hyalosign, Mnemosign, Onirosign, Audio-visual sign, Noosign.

* Email: musa.akrami@srbiau.ac.ir
Introduction

The semiotic discussions of Peirce had a great impact on the structure of Deleuze's leading books concerning cinema, i.e. *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image* (hereafter *Cinema 1*), and *Cinema 2: The Time-Image* (hereafter *Cinema 2*). Deleuze has used Peirce's semiotic discussions as one of his foundations in structuring the philosophy of cinema in these two books. This paper tries to discuss the use of Peircian semiotics in Deleuze's latter philosophy of cinema. The development from semiotics to philosophy with the help of Peircian semiotics and Bergsonian concept of time is done step by step. In *Cinema 1*, Deleuze relates “firstness,” “secondness” and “thirdness” with different cinematic epochs, creating different images of movement-image. According to Deleuze's *Cinema 1*, the development of cinema from the silent to classic cinema and golden age of Hollywood can be classified, in Peircian categorization, as the first epoch. In *Cinema 2*, the second epoch is the modern cinema and its new wave, which began in the wake of World War II marking the collapse of American dream in Hollywood. According to Deleuze, in this era the Peircian semiotics was unable to solve some important problems of changes in new cinema, both in types of the images and in the world after the World War II. In this evolutionary period, Deleuze concluded that semiotics by itself could not respond to the quick and continuous evolution of cinema after the War, during which artists were every day facing with new experiences. Here, the task of the philosopher is to create a sign which goes beyond a mere sign, approaching a new idea concerning both cinema and philosophy. In this way, Deleuze tries to determine Image-Thought which could be suitable for any genre or form of cinema. The authors try to investigate this evolutionary period and its gradual formation from semiotics in order to define the extent of Deleuze's success and achievement in his attempt to shift from semiotics to philosophy.

At first, we must review Peircian semiotics and then find its manifestations in different discussions of Deleuze's two books.

The semiotics of Peirce, which is formed on the basis of a “triadic relation,” is different from Ferdinand de Saussure's semiotics in that Saussure focuses on the sign itself. On one side of the sign there is a “signifier,” as a phonetic image of the word, and on the other side there is a “signified,” as a conceptual and mental image; these two sides make signs only by the reciprocal structural relation with each other, which is called “signification.” Peirce engages in the process of “producing and interpreting” the sign (semiosis). Peircian semiotics is more indebted to the theories of signs of Duns Scotus (1265-1308) which were later developed by John of St. Thomas (John Poinsot) (1589-1604). From Peirce's point of view, three elements of semiotics are “sign,” “signifier” and “signified”: “Saussure is said to have had a dyadic conception of a sign, as consisting of a signifier and what is signified, whereas Peirce had a triadic conception, by the addition of an ‘interpretant.’ The interpretant is a response to the sign that the sign elicits and in which that sign is taken to be a sign of an object” (Short: 18).
1. The Categories

Following his reading of the philosophers such as Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel, Peirce invented the categories of "firstness," "secondness" and "thirdness" that enabled him to think on whatever is imaginary or real. Peirce used three methods to reach these categories. One of his methods to reach the list of his categories is based on the "logic of relations." Any relation falls within one of the three categories. In defining these categories, it must be argued that "each is irreducible to the others, and all predicates with more than three places are reducible to triadic ones. For instance, "a is red" is monadic, "a hit b" is dyadic, and "a gives b to c" is triadic. A four-place predicate such as "a put b between c and d" is reducible to two three-place ones: "a put b in spot e"; "spot e is between c and d" (Misak: 21).

1.1. Thirdness

In order to understand the concept of thirdness, we discuss two general descriptions: "the third category involves a medium or connecting link between two things; irreducibly triadic action is such that an event A produces an event B as a means to the production of an event C" (Misak: 21); in other words, thirdness is "the mental or quasi-mental influence of one subject on another relatively to a third" (Peirce 1931-35, vol. 5: 469).

The features of thirdness from Peirce's point of view are: a) mediation, and b) representation; for example, "representation is such that an interpreting thought mediates between sign and object" (Misak: 21). In the universe of experiment, laws and habits are the signifiers of thirdness, law, or the necessity, and in the realm of quantity, continuity and generality are signifiers of thirdness.

1.2. Secondness

In expressing secondness, it must be mentioned that it is the "duality of action and reaction without any mediating force" (Misak: 21) or, in other words, it is "brute actions of one subject or substance on another, regardless of law or of any third subject" (Peirce 1931-35, vol. 5: 469). The features of secondness from Peirce's point of view find signifiers in "resistance," "struggle," "dyadic relations" such as "action/reaction," "cause/effect," etc. In the universe of experiment, "brute facts and matters" and "actuality" are the examples of secondness. In the realm of quantity, "singularity" and "discreteness" are the signifiers of the second type of categories.

1.3. Firstness

In explaining firstness as a "monadic element," it must be noted that "firstness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, positively and without reference to anything else" (Peirce 1958, vol. 8: 328) or the "positive internal characters of the
subject in itself" (Peirce 1931-35, vol.5: 469). The best interpretation of firstness is expressed in Peirce’s own sentences:

It cannot be articulately thought: assert it, and it has already lost its characteristic innocence; for assertion always implies a denial of something else. Stop to think of it, and it has flown! [...] that is first, present, immediate, fresh, new, initiative, original, spontaneous, free, vivid, conscious, and evanescent. Only, remember that every description of it must be false to it. (ibid, vol.11: 357)

In fact, the characteristic of firstness on this basis is the quality of feeling. In the world of experiment, “possibilities” and “chance” are signifiers of firstness and by virtue of quantity “vagueness” signifies the categories of the first type.

2. Classes of triadic signs

Peirce considered “logic” in its wide sense as the equivalent of semiotics and specifically as one of the three main classifications of semiotics, which was called by Peirce “logical critic”; the other two branches of semiotics are: 1) “speculative grammar” that studies methods in which an object or a signifier can be a sign, and 2) “methodeutic” or speculative rhetoric. By speculative grammar, Peirce analyzed kinds of signs and the ways they synthesize with each other. Accordingly, three classes of signs exist that can combine with each other and make 27 kinds of signs. Of these 27 kinds, 17 are logically impossible and only the remaining 10 kinds are possible. He divided the signs and semiotic elements to three classes based on his triadic categories:

1) Depending on the matter that as a sign:
   - it is based on quality or probability or a first or firstness; it is called “qualisign” or tone.
   - it is based on a subject or personal event or a second or secondness; it is called “sinisign” or token.
   - it is based on a norm or law or habit or a third or thirdness; it is called “legisign” or type.

2) Depending on the matter that as a sign it represents an object or signifier:
   - it is based on “resembling” or “imitating” the object or its signifier that is called “icon,” “semblance” or “likeness.” Its best example is drawing a portrait.
   - it is based on a real relation like “causality” with object and its signifier; it is called “index.” For example, fever which is a sign of illness or smoke which is a sign of fire.
   - it is based on a natural, official, or logical law it is related to its signifier (with Saussurian sign), which is called “symbol.” In this item the best example is words of a language.

3) depending on the matter that as a sign it represents its object and instance for signifier or interpretation:
   - it is based on the matter that it represents the object and instance for the signifier or interpretation as a quality or a possibility; it is called “rheme.”
sign, Peirce says that “a rheme is any sign that is neither true nor false, like almost any single word except yes and no which are almost peculiar to modern languages” (Peirce and Welby: 33-4).

-based on the matter that it represents the object and signifier for the signified or interpretation as a reality or real being; it is called “dicisign.” On this ground, Peirce writes that, “a dicent is not an assertion, but is a sign capable of being asserted. But, an assertion is a dicent. I define a dicent as a sign represented in its signified interpretant as if it were in a real relation to its object” (ibid).

-based on the matter that it represents the object for the signified or the interpretant as a law or habit; it is called suadisign. In defining this sign, Peirce says that, “an argument is any process of thought reasonably tending to produce a definite belief” (Peirce 1931-35, vol. 6: 45-60).

3. Peirce's semiotics in The Movement-Image

In The Movement-Image, Deleuze divides the images into six groups: Perception-image, Affection-image, Impulse-image, Action-image, Reflection-image, and Relation-image.

By using the categories of Peircian semiotics, Deleuze associates affection-image with firstness, action-image with secondness, and relation-image with thirdness. Additionally, by using Peircian semiotics he identifies perception-image with zeroness. Later, he defined two kinds of signs for each of the images, whether they were equivalents of Peirce’s categories or not: 1) sign of composition, and 2) sign of genesis.

3.1. Zeroness

As we mentioned before, for the first image presented in his first book on cinema, i.e. The Movement-Image, Deleuze created the expression of zeroness based on Peirce's categories.

In order to review different kinds of movement-image, first of all we must define the relationship between image and movement. Bergson and Deleuze believe that image is matter, as the following three citations show: 1) “cinematographic image is precisely the movement particular to each figure, the inner becoming of things, the evolutionary movement of dissociation and dissipation” (Coleman: 77); 2) “matter exists just as it is perceived; and, since it is perceived as an image” (Bergson: 1); and 3) “Matter, in our view, is an aggregate of ‘images’” (ibid). Image is the flowing matter meaning that we cannot find an anchorage or a center of reference in it. It is a flowing matter which is continually in the status of becoming. This universe is also a decentralized universe without the upper, lower, left, or right axis (Deleuze 2003: p. 63). In this world, the systems are open from one aspect and closed from another aspect; but Bergson's perception of object as an image in itself and resemblance of image and movement of matter leads us to the concept of plane of immanence:
The plane of immanence is the movement (the facet of movement) which is established between the parts of each system and between one system and others, ... which prevents them from being absolutely closed ... it is not an immobile and instantaneous section, it is a block of space-time.... There is even an infinite series of such blocks or mobile sections which will be, as it were, so many presentations of the plane, corresponding to the succession of movements in the universe. (Deleuze 2003: 59)

In this decentralized world, in every part of the plane of immanence there is an interval between the action and reaction. This interval is nothing but brain. The images show action and reaction against each other, some of the images receive the actions in one direction and execute them in another. Actually, by means of the intervals different modes of movement-image are made which are a received movement and an executed movement: perception-image receives the movement from one direction, affection-image is what occupies the interval, action-image is what executes action on another aspect, and relation-image is what reconstructs the whole movement with all aspects of the interval (Deleuze 2003: 63-65). Zeroness was the expression which Deleuze created in reaction to Peirce’s categories, justifying that each image must go forward through the analysis of the perception-image of a living image. As we observed before, the images show action and reaction against each other in all directions. Perception makes an interval between this action and reaction. If we consider the total as the spiral flight of a bird as a center of indetermination and an interval, perception-image is like a moment between two beats of the bird’s wings. According to Deleuze, perception-image is divided into two separate poles: subjective and objective. In the subjective perception-image, “it is seen by someone who forms part of the set” (ibid: 71), and in the objective perception-image, “the image is objective when the thing or the set are seen from the viewpoint of someone who remains external to that set” (ibid: 72). Some considered the subjective perception-image as the direct discourse and objective perception-image as the indirect discourse.

Pasolini recognized the creation of an audio-visual image equal to the indirect speech. Antonioni, Pasolini, and Godard were professionals in using obsessive framing:

[I]nsistent or obsessive framing, which makes the camera await the entry of a character into the frame, wait for him to do and say something and then exit, while it continues to frame the space which has once again become empty... the alternation of different lenses on a same image and the excessive use of the zoom, which doubles the perception of an independent aesthetic consciousness. (ibid: 74)

Here, perception-image instead of swinging between two subjective and objective poles is in a way “an immobilization according to a higher aesthetic form” (ibid: 76), which is like a composition sign in Peirce’s terminology: dicisign. Another kind of composition sign of the perception-image which exists in the perception blockage is Reume. This perception, as Deleuze said in Cinema 1, is seen mostly in the works of the prewar France, for example in the works of Jean Renoir who established the
school of running water in cinema or other directors of prewar in France (ibid: 76-79).

Here perception is divided into three forms:

1) Solid: dicisign is the composition sign of this perception;
2) Liquid: with the reume composition sign; and finally
3) Gas: the perception of gas with the cinema which Vertov presents and reaches its peak: cine-eye. From Vertov’s point of view, this instrument is domination over time and space and can connect any point in the world to any other point: cine-eye is “seeing without any destination and limitation” (Bogue: 74-75). By montage, what we see in the film is not from human point of view; rather it is the montage of a non-human eye which sets the perception-image in the matter. Montage is an eye inside objects. Here, Vertov describes the meaning of interval from his view point: “the interval is no longer that which separates a reaction from the action experienced, which measures the incommensurability and unforeseeability of the reaction but, on the contrary, that which—an action being given in a point of universe—will find the appropriate reaction in some other point, however distant it is” (Deleuze 2003: 82). In fact, this interval is not joining two images with a distance between them which is called interval, rather it is joining two images which have possibly interval within themselves (as we mentioned before, the meaning of montage from Vertov’s view point is joining two points of any time and space to any other point in the universe).

The film “A Man with a Movie Camera” is the demonstration of Vertov’s theories in film and is the best example of this assemblage. In this film, the image producing unit is called Photogramme. Photogramme is “an image corresponding to human perception, whatever the treatment to which it was subjected by montage” (ibid: 82). In describing this sign, it must be declared that the perception sign of gas is gramme, a total perception placed inside the matter. From Deleuze’s point of view, gramme is a sign of genesis, which means a point that, for example in our discussion, causes a change in perception.

3.2. Firstness: Power and Quality

As we stated before, affection-image is an image which fills the interval between perception and action. The first part of the body which reflects affection is face. According to Bergson’s definition “the moving body has lost its movement of extension, and movement has become movement of expression. It is this combination of a reflecting, immobile unity and of intensive expression movements which constitutes the effect” (ibid: 87).

In fact, facial movements are such as the movements of lips, eyebrows, etc. Micro-movements are parts of intensive series and reflecting or reflected unity. As a reflecting surface, face declares a common quality, whereas intensive series as expressive micro-movements go from one quality to another quality, which is what Deleuze calls power (pouissance). Griffith and Eisenstein, as two moviemakers who have used close-up a lot (Deleuze believes that affection-image is equal to close-up and face), each has used one of the two poles of the face as the feature of close-up,
though it must be mentioned that any moviemaker uses both poles of close-up. However, in each of these two directors one of these poles finds priority over the other. Deleuze believes that Einstein emphasizes intensive faces and Griffith emphasizes the reflexive face (ibid: 91). As one of the features of affection, face turned external movement in space into expressive movement. As something that shows affection, face is called expressiveness. As a whole “we call the set of the expressed and its expression, of the affect and the face, ‘icon’” (ibid: 97). As a sign of composition, icon is divided into contour icon as quality and tradit icon as power. The expressiveness of the image in face and close-up leads us to Peirce’s firstness: it is felt more than being understood and perceived. Close-up and face as an isolated face are free from any determination of time and space. Here, a kind of deterritorialisation happens. On this ground, Epstein says that, “this face of a feeling coward, as soon as we see it is close-up, we see cowardice in person, the feeling-thing, [and] the entity”… (ibid: 96). In fact, face is separated from the existing continuity in films and scenes, and we see a kind of fragmentation in it. This disconnection creates a particular kind of space called “any-space whatever” (espace quelconque).

Any-space whatever is called the genetic signs of the affection-image and is the equivalent of qualsign or potisign. Two kinds of any-space whatever are disconnection and vacuity. The expressionist cinema of Germany is another kind of affection-image. With two characteristics of power and quality, affection is pure possibility; if it becomes active in the state of things, it is transmitted into force and consequently into action-image. However, if it remains in its potential state and is not actualized, it remains as affection-image.

3.2.1. Impulse-Image

Deleuze calls the quality and power which are actualized within the situation of objects “action-image”; but he believes that between affection-image and action-image there is a domain which is called impulse-image: “Between the virtual espaces quelconques of affects and the actual milieus of actions, Deleuze identifies a domain that belongs clearly to neither [rather, it belongs to] one of ‘originary worlds’ and impulses” (Bogue: 82). Deleuze calls impulse-image “degenerate affect” or embryonic action. In expressing the originary world, it must be stated that it is the mid-way between any-space whatever and the actual milieu.

Originary world is a fluid and floating space in which the film happens and takes the milieu into a closed world. Symptom is the impulse-image’s genetic sign and has association with originary world. The symptom “designates the qualities or powers related to an originary world (defined by impulses)” (Deleuze 2003: 218). The impulse-image’s genetic sign is fetish or idol, divided into “good fetish” or relic and “bad fetish.” Fetish is the representation of fragments such as a shoe, feminine frippery, etc., which has a special significance as a partial object, that is, “the fragment which simultaneously belongs to the originary world and is torn from the real object of the derived milieu [by means of the impulse]” (ibid). Ronald Bogue...
believes that although both symptom as a genesis sign and fetish as composition sign correspond to the derived milieu and originary world, they do not share equal closeness with these two domains; for instance, symptom is more closely tied to imaginary worlds so that in *Cinema i's* glossary, Deleuze recognizes it as the equivalent of originary world. Impulse-image’s originary world is a universe in which there is change, being, and duration, and this is one of the greatest achievements of the naturalistic cinema. Of all the movement-images, this image has the greatest affinity with time-image. In these films, we are faced with “psychological duration,” this ‘time’ is naturalistic. In *Cinema 1*, Deleuze believes that Eric von Stroheim (1885-1957), Bunuel Portoles (1900-1983), and Joseph Walton Losey (Nowell-Smith: 74 & 708) are pre-eminent directors of this method (*ibid*: 151-155).

### 3.3. Secondness

This sort of image is the most prevalent structure of cinematic works in most places of the world due to its narrative nature. If the realm of affection-image is idealism, the realm of action-image would be realism. Action-image is divided into large form and small form with composition signs and separated genesis. Action-image is the activity domain of quality and power, so that “when qualities and powers are apprehended as actualized in states of things, in milieu which are geographically and historically determinable, we enter into the realm of the action-image” (*ibid*: 123).

Action-image is the territory of Peirce’s secondness. As we saw before, secondness is based on dyadic relations such as action/reaction, cause/effect, etc.; and every event is based on its relation with actual world and this kind of movement-image is based on these dualities. This duality is based on the existing duel in action-image. Action has a kind of duality within itself: “duel with the milieu, with the others, with itself” (*ibid*: 142). Within this duel or struggle, one of the composition signs of action-image which is called “binominal” is formed.

“Synsign” and binominal are composition signs of the large form. Synsign alludes to action-image as a systematic representation, and the other discusses its functionality. In expressing synsign, Deleuze writes that, “synsign (or encompasser) corresponds to Peirce’s sinisyne. Set of qualities and powers as actualized is a state of things, thus constituting a real milieu around a centre, a situation in relation to a subject: spiral” (*ibid*: 218).

The large form of action-image created a sort of moviemaking and acting based on the pair of object and emotion the representative of which is “Actors Studio” and, as Deleuze says, one of the pre-eminent directors of this style was Ellia Kazan (1909-2003) (*ibid*: 155-59). From Deleuze’s point of view, “large form” or systematic representation must be engendered instead of composition and it was not possible unless, on the one hand, situation permeates into character and, on the other hand, character permeates into the action in a way. Here, the realism of the film becomes apparent through the play of the actors and characters of the film. Actors Studio
makes a kind of sensorimotor link; on the one hand, object makes relationship, even imaginary relation, with situation, for example, with clothes, tools, and, on the other hand, the object with this relation arouses affective memory: an emotion and a “pair of object/emotion” or emotive objects come into existence, that, according to Deleuze, the genesis sign of action-image is imprint or impression. Bogue believes that “this issue can be seen in the movie ‘On the Waterfront,’ where the man is ashamed and feels guilty and picks up the woman’s gloves and keeps them, then he plays with them and slips them on his hand” (Ciment: 74). Using the pair of object and emotion is a method of acting which Actors Studio suggests: “what appears outside is in the intersection of the state which pierces and permeates and the action which blows up.” In small form, we move from action to situation. In this situation, the formula is no longer SAS’ (i.e. situation, action, another situation(s’)), rather it is ASA’ (i.e. action, situation, another action (A’)); we move from an equivocal action to a new and adjusted action via a clarified situation. If the large form is universal, the small form is local. Here, composition sign is divided into index of lack and index of equivocity. When action clarifies “a situation which is not given” and we are affected with lack of situation and we understand it through the reasoning we have of action, we face index of lack as a reasoning-image. Deleuze says that the film “Public Opinion” by Charlie Chaplin (1887-1977) is an example of this index in which we find out the relationship of the heroine with the rich man without seeing the events happened to her (Deleuze 2003: 161). Index of equivocity is a little more complicated. A small difference between two kinds of action brings us into a very large distance between the two situations. Here, Deleuze’s example is clear: a man with a knife is seen beside a corpse, whether he has killed the man with this knife or he has just pulled the knife out of his lifeless body. In index, Deleuze perfectly explains these two divisions: “[Index] used by Peirce in order to designate a sign which refers to its object by a material link used here in order to designate the link of an action (or of an effect of action) to a situation which is not given, but merely inferred, or which remains equivocal and reversible we distinguish in this sense indices of lack and indices of equivocity” (Deleuze, 2003: 218). Bogue (as well as Deleuze) believes that the school of documentation of England in 1930s is an example of this type of filmmaking (ibid: 87). The genesis sign of the small form is vector or the line of the universe or the skeleton-space:

There is no longer communication between an organically situated interior and an outside [which surrounds it], giving it a living milieu [the outside] which is a source of assistance as much as aggression. Here, on the contrary, [the large form,] the unexpected, the violent, the event, come from the interior whilst the exterior is rather the location of the customary or premeditated action, in a curious reversal of the outside and the inside. (ibid: 166)

The vector space puts together the actions as important yet heterogeneous movements. Here, encompassing stroke gives its place to broken stroke. The breathing space in the large form here changes into vector space. This small form’s
genesis sign finds its best representation in the new western films (Deleuze 2003: 164-169).

3.3.1. Reflection-Image

In the mid-way of action-image as secondness and relation-image as thirdness, there is reflection-image which is also called transformation-image. Whenever movement happens from the large form to the small form we encounter a reflection-image. This deforming may have both forms. The composition sign of this sort of action-image is “figure.” Figure is the sign of transformation, it is a “sign which, instead of referring to its object, reflects another (scenographic or plastic image); or which reflects its own object, but by inverting it (inverted image); or which directly reflects its object (discursive image)” (ibid: 218).

Although reflection-image is between action-image and relation-image, it is still dependent on action-image as a transformation and deforming form; though it introduces a third part as an indirect relation between situation and action in action-image, which we will know in relation-image as Peirce’s thirdness. In declaring theatrical representation, Deleuze says that, “the real situation does not immediately give rise to an action which corresponds to it, but it is expressed in a fictitious action which will merely prefigure a project, or a real action to come. Instead of $S \rightarrow A$, we have $S \rightarrow A'$ (fictitious theatrical action), $A'$ consequently serving as index to the real action, $A$” (ibid: 182). Bogue described this kind of image in the film “Ivan the Terrible.” Ivan expresses the scarification of his cousin Vladimir as the most important enemy of Ivan in a show arranged by his guardians (ibid: 93). In the expression of plastic representation, it must be stated that “the action does not immediately disclose the situation which it envelops, but is itself developed in grandiose situations which compass the implied situation. Instead of $A \rightarrow S$, we have $A \rightarrow S'$” (ibid: 182). Stone lions in the “Battleship Potemkin” and sculpture series in the film “October” show this plastic representation (ibid: 182). The large form is linked to small form via plastic representation. In both cases, a third element expresses the link between the two forms, but because of the link between relation-image and action-image it becomes manifest only later in relation-image.

Deleuze considers the figure of thought equal to the reflection-image’s sign of genesis which means discursive figure. For a better understanding of this figure we must review the works of some directors. For example, the talkies of Charlie Chaplin to some extent express the transformation-image’s genesis sign. The films “The Great Dictator,” “Monsieur Verdoux,” “Limelight,” and “A King in New York” are placed in this group. Chaplin inserts discursive-image into his works:

We are no longer merely dealing with two opposing situation ...; it is a case of two states of society, two opposable societies, one of which makes the slight difference between men into the instrument of an infinite distance between situations (tyranny), and the other which would make the slight difference between men the variable of a great situation of community and Communality (Democracy). (ibid: 172)
"The Great Dictator" depicts the discursive figure in the best way. The two characters of Jewish barber and Hitler are both played by Chaplin, the famous moustache of Chaplin that belongs to two different characters of the film, i.e. Hitler and the barber; Hitler's famous speech in this film arouses this question in the mind of the addressee that whether there is a Hitler (dictator) inside each ordinary man?

3.4. Thirdness

Deleuze recognizes relation-image as the equivalent of Peirce's thirdness. The best representation of thirdness is relation, because relation is always the third part of a relationship and is external to it. Here, we consider two groups of relations which are natural and abstract; for example, when we see two images consecutively and in the mind these images have logical relationship which is natural. Abstract relation happens when two images do not naturally relate to each other in mind, here a mental comparison between two images takes place. Thus, we understand that relation-image has direct association with thought. Composition signs of relation-image are introduced here: mark and demark. Mark "designates natural relations, that is, the aspect under which images are linked by a habit which takes [fait passer] us from one to the other. Demark designates an image torn from its natural relations" (ibid: 218). As we described in the previous section, habit and law are signifiers of thirdness, and the tendency to create order and law is one of the characteristics of, or, in other words, habit of mind. In triadic classes we observe formation of law. For example, consider the dyadic class (2, 4). In this dyadic class there is no law, but as soon as the third part enters the law is made (2, 4, 8) or (2, 4, 6). In the first case, there is a squaring law and in the second case a multiplication law. By means of the notion of law, Deleuze expresses reflection-image's genesis sign which is symbol. Symbol is "used by Peirce to designate a sign which refers to its object by virtue of a law. Used in order to designate the support of abstract relations, that is to say of a comparison of terms independently of their natural relations" (ibid: 218). Thus, thirdness has a kind of relation within itself. Firstness is a mono relation. Secondness has a firstness in addition to the secondness in itself, whereas thirdness has a triadic relation of a firstness, a secondness, and a thirdness, which is external compared to firstness and secondness. Although we see thought and intellect in other types of images like affection-image and action-image, relation-image "is an image which takes as objects of thought, objects which have their own existence outside thought, just as the objects of perception have their own existence outside perception. It is an image which takes as its object, relations, symbolic acts, intellectual feelings" (ibid: 198).

4. Beyond Semiotics of Peirce: Time-Image

As we saw before, Deleuze in his first book classified images based on the semiotics of Peirce. In his second book on cinema, he reviews the cinema of the post
Second World War and the classification of images; this time he follows Peirce on the basis of both direct relation of time and his innovative semiotics. The classification of images on the basis of new semiotics is as follows.

4.1. Audio-Visual Sign

Political, social, and economic elements each had a share in the decline of the movement-image. After the Second World War, cinema needed increased thinking, which questioned the image systems’ thought governing cinema such as action/reaction, perceptions, affections, etc.; and after that shattered sensorimotor links as the most important features of the movement-image:

The first thing to be compromised everywhere are the linkages of situation-action, action-reaction, excitation-response, in short, the sensorimotor links which produced the action-image …; we need new signs. A new kind of image is born that one can attempt to identify in the post-war American cinema, outside Hollywood. (ibid: 206)

Deleuze considered five features for the new image which are:

1. Image does not refer to the universal or local situation the same as before (as action-image did), rather the new situation is dispersed.

2. Weak links are the second feature of the new image. The links disintegrate and chance is the only linking string of the events. Here, the line of universe which linked the important moments and incidents to each other in the small form of action-sign disintegrates. Consequently, reality is omitted or dispersed. In “Too Late Blues” by Cassavetes and in “Taxi Driver” by Martin Scorcese we observe the indifference and disorientation of actions (Deleuze 2003: 209).

3. The third feature is the balade-form where sensorimotor links give their place to roam and wander. This wander is often in any-space whatever and in opposition with action which takes place in a specified time and space. Wandering of the driver in his taxi or the use of any-space whatever in “Dog Day Afternoon” and “Serpico” by Sidney Lumet are examples of this case (Deleuze 2003: 208).

4. The fourth element of creation of the new image is using the clichés: the dispersed and omitted reality, weak links … incidents which fallen on the characters do not belong to people who give up to incidents or arouse them. Now, what it integrates is the current clichés of a period of time: They are these floating images, these anonymous clichés, which circulate in the external world, but which also penetrate each one of us and constitute his internal world, so that everyone possesses only psychic clichés by which he thinks and feels, is thought and is felt [by others], being himself a cliché among the others in the world which surrounds him. Physical, optical and auditory clichés and psychic clichés mutually feed on each other, in order for people to be able to bear themselves and the world. (ibid: 208-9).

5. Finally, the fifth and the last element of production of a new image is in the denunciation of the conspiracy. Deleuze, in Cinema 1, describes “Network” and “Prince of the City,” both made by Sidney Lumet, are the best examples of conspiracy
in the film (ibid: 210). For the first time outside Hollywood the five features of new image appeared in neorealist cinema of Italy which is the biggest center of the moviemaking in the world. The audio-visual situation has two subjective and objective poles. Here, we see the principle of indeterminability or indiscernibility. Real and imaginary, subjective and objective are no more recognizable from one another. The look passes regularly from imaginary to real and vice versa, and this movement creates a kind of circuit. That is why the poles continually crash and encounter.

4.2. Mnemosign or Recollection-Image, Onirosign or Dream-Image

By analyzing the neorealist cinema of Italy, we enter time-image. The relations of time and movement were reversed. In movement-image, the movement conquered time, but in time-image we observe the opposite and time dominates movement and this is for the reason of using aberrant movement. There is something here that makes balance in the movement-image, here the interval puts and creates a sensorimotor pattern which balances movement-image and normalizes movement. Deleuze explains movement-image when it is not still balanced and has aberrant movement (this description is in fact the expression of aberrant and abnormal movement):

The movement-image does not reproduce a world, but constitutes an autonomous world, made up of breaks and disproportion, deprived of all its centers, addressing itself as such to a viewer who is in himself no longer center of his own perception. The percipiens and the percipi have lost their points of gravity. (ibid: 37)

We saw that the audio-visual image had two poles of real and virtual, subjective and objective, physical and psychological which usually are inseparable in a point called the indiscernibility point. Mnemosign and onirosign are two types of these images in the creation of which two poles of real and virtual partake. For the better understanding of these two images first we must describe Bergson’s concept of recognition in the book Matter and Dream. Bergson used two kinds of memory to explain his concepts:

1. Habits make habitual memory in us. For example, when we read a poem repeatedly, we memorize it unconsciously, and after a while we can read its verses continuously. Such a memory uses this action (which here is memorizing of a poem) for an object or a function at present time. This memory works automatically and associates with perception. It also serves for particular goals. Bergson himself says: “There are [...] two memories which are profoundly distinct: the one, fixed in the organism, is nothing else but the complete set of intelligently constructed mechanisms which ensure the appropriate reply to the various possible demands” (Bergson: 61).

2. Pure memory which maintains past in form of Recollection-Image. Its place is not in mind or body, but is completely free and spiritual. Bergson says: “it retains and
ranges alongside of each other all our states in the order in which they occur, leaving to each fact its place and consequently marking its date, truly moving in the past and not, like the first, in an ever renewed present” (ibid: 61).

4.2.1. Automatic or Habitual Recognition
In this type, the perception expands itself in the normal movement; thus, this recognition is a sensorimotor recognition, that is, “to recognize an object is to revive a past memory of it and note its resemblance to the present object. Such recognition is most often automatic and unconscious” (Bogue: 111). Consider a city which seems odd and alien in the first look, but when we live in it for a while we subconsciously know the city and its streets.

4.2.2. Attentive Recognition
The emphasis of the perception is on the object and its different aspects and it is done consciously. Such recognition happens in the audio-visual image and each time it takes place through one of the aspects of the object: “when I consciously pay attention to an object, I summon up a remembered image of the object and superimpose it on the perceived object” (Bogue: 112). Attentive recognition happens in mnemosign. In the automatic or habitual recognition, although mnemosign puts itself between stimulation and answer, in attentive recognition we see the formation of an orbit which is the requisite of this recognition.

Mnemosign is used in the form of flashback in the cinematic works. In flashback, the orbit of the mnemosign is formed properly. We are continually moving to the past and returning to the present, i.e. moving toward virtual image and returning to the real image.

Directors like Joseph Leo Mankiewicz (1909-1993) and Marcel Carne (1906-1996) have used flashback in their works (Deleuze 2000: 48-55). In dream, the orbit of mnemosign also exists, but in the weakest state possible. Pay attention to sleep in which the sensorimotor system is in its lowest level and we join deepest layers of recollection. In fact, here we face a larger orbit:

We start from a perception-image, the nature of which is to be actual, the recollection ... is necessarily a virtual image. But, in the first case, it becomes actual in so far as it is summoned by the perception-image. It is actualized in a recollection-image which corresponds to the perception-image. The case of dream brings two important differences to light. On the one hand, the sleeper's perceptions exist, but in the diffuse condition of a dust of actual sensations—external and internal—which are not grasped in themselves, escaping consciousness. On the other hand, the virtual image which becomes actual does not do so directly, but becomes actual in a different image, which itself plays the role of virtual image being actualized in a third, and so on to infinity (Deleuze 2000: 56).
Here, Deleuze concludes that dream and dream-image are not metaphor or metonymy, rather dream is a continuous becoming which endures infinitely. There are different examples of dream in the works of filmmakers such as René Clair and Buñuel (Deleuze 2000: 57-58) because of their closeness to the school of surrealism and even in the works of a filmmaker like Buster Keaton because of his Dadaist thoughts.

4.3. Hyalosign or Crystal-Image

In the recollection-image we saw two real and imaginary images, virtual and current which made an orbit together. Bergson talks about mirror-image in which a real image, a real object has reflection in a mirror-image and this makes a virtual object or virtual image. But, the reflection of a real image in mirror and creation of virtual image in mirror-image does not make an orbit like it did before (later we will see that mirror-image dose not describe all dimensions of crystal-image). On the contrary, here we observe the coexistence of the past, present, and the future:

We always say that the present changes or passes, that it becomes the past when a new present replaces it, without seeing that herein lies the problem and that the foundation of becoming-past as such is what must be understood... Rather than imagining a present that would be gradually pushed into the past by the “Coming of a subsequent present,” or even, in Husserl’s sense, an “extended now” that would in itself have a double orientation toward the past and the future, Bergson postulates the pure coexistence of the present and its own past. The present does not withdraw of itself [to the past], and the past need not wait to follow it [i.e. the present]: they are strictly contemporaneous. What separates and distinguishes them is not a temporal axis but the different modalities of the actual and the virtual: the present is actual, whereas its contemporaneous past is virtual. (Marrati: 73)

Real image is the audio-visual image discrete of sensorimotor links reflected in its virtual image (the better expression is crystalized); thus, it can be said that crystal-image is the genetic element of the audio-visual image.

4.4. Chronosign

In the realm of the crystal-image, the virtual and real image created an orbit making an indeterminable or indiscernible point in which the real was not recognizable form the virtual. In the territory of chronosign, unlike the crystal-image, we do not observe the coexistence of the real and the virtual or the past and the present images. Here, we perceive the peaks of the present or sheets of the past. The indeterminable or indiscernible point is turned into undecidable or inextricable points. The undecidable or inextricable thing is the distinction between the true and the false. The first type of chronosign is time order. In declaring the order of time, Deleuze says that, “this order is not made up of succession, nor is it something as the interval or the whole of indirect representation. It is a matter of the internal relations
of time, in a topological or quantic form” (Deleuze 2000: 274). The order of time is divided into two signs:

1. What Deleuze calls aspect, that is, the coexistence of all the sheets of the past: “it is the coexistence of all the sheets of past, with the topological transformation of these sheets, and the overtaking of psychological memory towards a world-memory” (op. cit.).

2. Sometimes the connection of the present points which are called accent: “these points breaking with all external succession, and carrying out quantic jumps between the presents which are doubled by the past, the future and the present itself” (op. cit.).

The second type of time is chronosign as “time as series.” In time-image, time challenges the meaning of truth and one of the aspects of this challenge manifests in contingent future: “it is possible that the battle may take place, but also that it may not. If tomorrow the battle actually occurs, then one of today’s possibilities becomes impossible—that the battle may not take place. The conclusion is that either the impossible proceeds from the possible (since what was possible yesterday becomes impossible today) or the past is not necessarily true (since yesterday the battle could have not taken place)” (Bogue: 148). This concept means that the past is false and is not true. Leibniz tried to solve this contradiction: “there are an infinite number of possible worlds—worlds that God did not see fit to bring into existence. Now, given that Leibniz’s safe claim is that, “[t]here are as many possible worlds as there are series of things that can be conceived that do not imply a contradiction” (Look: 3). He believed that, for example, there might or might not be a fight and this matter does not make the impossible surpass the possible because each of these possibilities happen in two different worlds and not in one world. Both of the worlds are possible but this does not mean that they are compatible. Leibniz used the concept of “incompossible” to solve this problem (ibid); hence, the past seems true without really being true: “it is not the impossible, but only the incompossible that proceeds from the possible; and the past may be true without being necessarily true” (Deleuze 2000:330). The new narration discards being true and becomes false. Two worlds, in one of which the impossible things happen and in the other of which the possible ones happen, solve the problem of indiscernible point we encountered in the mirror-image. The false power solves this problem. However, we have a problem here: it is true that, for example, we can have incompossible presents which are related to the false or let us say not necessarily true pasts; but since the sheets of the past or peaks of the present are intertwined and we will never have a single sheet of the past or a peak of the present, if every present peak or past sheet is true, other peaks or sheets are false. Thus, by Leibniz’s solution although the present peaks and past sheets would not have a problem of indiscernibility, they remain inexplicable and undecidable because still we are not able to understand which peak or sheet is true or false. To solve this problem, the concept of the series is presented: time as series:

When we consider a succession of events in a commonsense-fashion, each event seems a discrete moment, a point in time and the sequence of moments from a uniform line
which we tend to view from the outside, as it were, simply observing points A, B, and C, and noting their positions, A before B, C after B. But, if we consider the events from "inside," as participants in the events, we sense the dynamic surge of time, the passing of A through B and into C…. This dynamic surge is puissance, a power or potency of time. (Bogue: 149)

There is no point before or after from inside. In the description of after and before, Deleuze says that:

A series is a sequence of images, which tend in themselves in the direction of a limit, which orients and inspires the first sequence (before), and gives way to another sequence organized as series which tends in turn toward another limit (the after). The before and the after are then no longer successive determinations of the course of time, but the two side of the power, or the passage of the power to a higher power. (Deleuze 2000: 275)

Everything is a sequence of moments. That is what Deleuze calls empirical sequence. This sequence of moments is possible only through continuous being and turns this sequence into series. Consequently, as a direct time-image "series" is the being of power. Deleuze calls time-image genesign:

... the genesign, has therefore also the property of bringing into question the notion of truth: for false ceases to be a simple appearance or even a lie, in order to achieve that power of becoming which constitutes series of degrees, which crosses limits, carries out metamorphoses, and develops along its whole path an act of legend, of story-telling. Beyond the true or false, becoming as power of the false. (op. cit.)

The expressionist cinema of Germany was the pioneer of the creation of true-false, good and evil, and being worshiped. Bogue believes that the ethno-fictional documentary of Jean Rouch is another example of this kind of cinema. His ethno-fictional documentaries such as “Mad Masters,” “Jaguar,” and “Me, a Black” reconstructs the reality by means of actors which is a way used by documentarians such as Flaherty (ibid: 151-155).

4.5. Noosign

Time-image is a kind of thought-image and we arouse thought via time-images; it is here that we enter the realm of noosigns: “an image goes beyond itself towards something which can only be thought” (ibid: 335). Thus, thought-image is not just in the realm of time-image, wherever thinking is aroused we are in the domain of thought. Here thought-image is differently divided into: classical thought-image, and modern thought-image.

In depicting the thought, Deleuze asked the question that “do image, cinema, and thought affect one another or not?” Does cinema have the ability to create a shock in the mind and the brain? Sublime creates a kind of shock in thought and moves the imagination beyond the limits, where thought is forced to think about the total. In Cinema 1, Deleuze believes that the sublime exists in the cinematic works in different
kinds: the mathematical sublime in the works of Gance or the dynamic sublime in
the works of Murnau and Lang (ibid: 45-49). Deleuze introduces another kind of
sublime: the dialectical sublime in the works of Eisenstein. He and his works are the
good examples of the relationship of image and thought. Deleuze uses the example
of Eisenstein and his works and generalizes the relationship of image and thought in
the works of this filmmaker to the whole cinema of the movement-image. Three
minutes of relationship of image and thought in the analysis of Eisenstein’s works are
as follows.

4.5.1. From Image to Thought or From Perception to Concept

By means of different methods of montage, Eisenstein created shock. To describe
the relationship of montage and shock, Deleuze writes:

The shock has an effect on the spirit, it forces it to think, and to think the whole. The
whole can only be thought, because it is the indirect representation of time which
follows from movement. It does not follow like a logical effect, analytically, but
synthetically as the dynamic effect of images “on the whole cortex.” Thus, it relies on
montage, although it follows from the image: it is not a sum, but a “product,” a unity of
a higher order. The whole is the organic totality which presents itself by opposing and
overcoming its own parts, and which is constructed like the great spiral in accordance
with the laws of dialectic. The whole is the concept. (ibid: 158)

In Cinema 2, Deleuze discusses about the cinematic image that makes a spiritual
automaton which reacts to the movement. This expression is taken from Spinoza.
Spinoza invented the physical automaton versus spiritual automaton: the animals are
spiritual automatons in which mechanical bodies react to constant laws of physics
(ibid: 165-166). As human beings have spirit and mind and like animals conform to
the laws of cause and effect, they do not react thorough a mechanical body, so
humans are immaterial automatons or spiritual automatons. This expression shows
the autonomous nature of response and psyche as well: the autonomy of response.
The proletarian cinema of Eisenstein creates a shock in the addressees. For this
director, montage acts as a collision, each scene creates a collision with other scenes
in the montage besides having the potentiality of shock. According to Eisenstein, in
the book entitled Film Form, each scene acts like fuel that with its combustion it
makes the machine move (ibid: 77-78).

4.5.2. From Thought to Image

Eisenstein continuously emphasizes that the intellectual is associated with
sensory thought or emotional intelligence. In moving from thought to image, in fact
we move from the concept to the material image or figure-image which constructs
the concept in the subconscious. Deleuze assumes the movement from image to
thought and from thought to image as an orbit which passes the shock caused by our
images to the conscious thinking; on the other hand, movement from thought to
image is where the thought of the figures which effectively take us to the images shock us. This expressing of thought is sensual: “sensual thinking is thought via concrete images and their associative-affinities with one another” (Bogue: 167). Again, we witness the dialectical concept of Eisenstein: Continuity of awareness is seen in moving from the image to the internal speech or the internal monologue:

Cinema is typically metonymic, because it essentially proceeds by juxtaposition and contiguity: it doesn’t have metaphor’s specific power of giving a “subject” the verb or action of another subject: it has to juxtapose the two subjects, and so make the metaphor subject to a metonymy. Cinema cannot say with the poet: “hands flutter”; it must first show hands being moved about quickly and then leaves fluttering. (Deleuze 2000: 160)

Eisenstein’s virtual montage is made based on the harmony of image. In the film “strike,” the master’s spy is shown reversely as his feet are in the puddle, in the next shot we see two chimneys which are in the clouds. The feet and chimneys, the clouds and puddle are harmonies of images and the two shots make a metaphor through montage.

4.5.3. Immanent general concept

The third minute from Deleuze’s point of view is neither the movement to thought nor its contrary, rather identity assumes the general concept and image in itself and for itself. Here, the relation between man and world and man and nature is noticed. The unity of image and thought provides us with action-thought in which action includes the relationship of the actor as human to the world around him, action-thought from Eisenstein’s point of view not only demonstrated the unity of human and the world for the sensorimotor unity, but also considered the individual and the mass unity necessary, what later and in the period of Stalinism and cult of personality put him into trouble. With the beginning of bolshevization of the masses, Eisenstein tried to create heroes by the individuation of the masses so that besides the dramatic aspects they would have the popular aspect or in other words massive aspect.

The result of this attempt is the films like “Alexander Nevsky” and “Ivan, The Terrible” (Deleuze 2000: 163). With the rise of the Second World War and the modern cinema’s appearance the laws of the classical cinema such as continuation are shattered and sensorimotor pattern collapsed with the coming of flows such as neorealism and after that with the new wave of the French cinema (Deleuze 2003: 197-215; Deleuze 2003: 1-12). In the classical cinema, the images disrupt based on the affinity of classic thinking and we are faced with a phenomenon called the unthankable, where thought does not respond to the new situation completely. In the modern cinema, the concept of outside replaces the whole in the classical cinema:
The whole was thus being continually made, in cinema, by internalizing the image and externalizing itself in the images, following a double attraction. This was the process of an always open totalization, which defined montage or the power of thought. In the first place, the question is no longer that of the association or attraction of images. What count is on the contrary the interstice between images, between two images.” (Deleuze 2000: 279)

If like the classical cinema we classify the relations of modern cinema and thoughts, we will see important features in this relation. The first point is omitting the whole and totalization of images for the sake of the outside.

The second point is the elimination of the internal monologue as the whole of the film for the sake of a free direct discourse. In the modern cinema, the unity of author, characters, and the world is eliminated and the author expresses himself through the interference of an independent character or a third person. Using the third person point of view for narrating the story of the film disrupts the traditional relation between the images in the classical cinema: “In the absence of the classic cinema’s inner monologue that links images in commonsense sequences, vision is disconnected from stable points of view, as if the images were those of a non-human seeing, a floating eye, as prismatic eye, multiple eyes dispersed across space” (Bogue: 177).

Changing the point of view in the modern cinema creates new concepts such as changing the spiritual automaton which belonged to the viewer in the classical cinema. In the modern cinema, a particular point of view gives its place to multiple points of view and this time the position of the spiritual automaton is not only inside the viewer, but also inside the image. These features are: “probabilistic and irrational, which constitute the new image of thought. Each is easily inferred from the others, and forms with the others a circulation: the noosphere” (Deleuze 2000: 215). From Deleuze’s point of view, work of the filmmakers like Kubrick (1928-1999) and Resnais (Deleuze 2000: 205-215) are the displays of the cinema of the brain. In the work of Kubrick, the brain and the universe become one and the same. The round glittering table of the film “Dr. Strangelove,” the huge computer of the film “Space Odyssey 2001,” the hotel of the film “Shining,” etc. form the identity, the brain, and the universe (ibid: 205-206). A severe shock happens in the brain where inside and outside face each other. In the films of Resnais we observe a new form in the cinema of the brain within which outside and inside are related to each other by means of recollection. Here, recollection does not mean the faculty of having recollections, rather it is a membrane which makes the sheets of the past and the reality face each other in the present: “Hiroshima, My Love,” “Stavisky,” etc. were the third relation of the modern cinema to thought, the elimination of unity and the integration of human and universe caused by the failure of the sensorimotor plan. The result of this failure destroys the believability of the world. The effort of the modern cinema is to return our beliefs in the universe, no need to believe in something else, rather to believe in this world as it is. The connection of the human and the universe in the modern cinema is arranged by different chronosigns such as the false power past sheets, present peaks, etc.
Conclusion

Deleuze has used a wide range of the terms of Peirce's semiotics to describe the philosophical concepts of Movement-Image. In Time-Image he has used Peirce's method of semiotics in structuring the concepts of his second book. Dicisign, Icon, Reume, Qualisign, Synisign, Index, and Symbol are Peirce's terms which are used directly in the construction of the cinematic signs of Deleuze in his first book. In his book Cinema 2, Deleuze created the time-image with the infrastructure of Peirce's semiotics and the materials of Bergson's concepts. He, in his first book on the movement-image, reviews the concepts of firstness, secondness, thirdness, and intermediary images through the study of composition and genesis signs, whereas the review of direct image of time under the titles such as opsigns, chronosigns, and noosigns are not accomplished through composition and genesis signs like before. Here, Deleuze reviews and interprets signs and images through Bergson's concepts. Deleuze uses these signs as benchmarks to reach the main and, we think, the most important achievement in his book: Thought-Image, Noosign. Deleuze adopts Peircian semiotics for different genres in classic cinema, and uses Bergsonian concepts for structuring the signs of modern cinema, achieving the peak of his semiotics. Thought-image not only discusses the modern cinema, but also explains the classic cinema. It must be mentioned that this philosopher acts rather successfully in creating a philosophical system for cinema based on Peirce's semiotics although in this path sometimes he classifies each period of the classical cinema on the basis of Peirce's categories and sometimes classifies time-image, based on his innovative semiotics, according to Peirce's method; in this classification sometimes different periods overlap and interfere with each other. In the end, Deleuze is successful in connecting the cinema and philosophy as well as drawing Noosign, and surpasses the limits in explaining special genres. His view can interpret any cinematic genre, both modern and classic. He is successful in showing that cinema is a bridge to reach the appropriate understanding of philosophy; so that one may agree that cinema itself is philosophy itself.
References


Eisenstein, Sergei (1957), *Film Form and Film Sense*, trans. and ed. by Jay Leida, New York: Meridian Books.


