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What Counts as Agency in Artificial Systems? Bats, Technological Mediation, Digital Dinosaurs, and the Space of Reasons | ||
| مجله پژوهش های فلسفی | ||
| مقاله 19، دوره 20، شماره 56، مهر 1405، صفحه 297-316 اصل مقاله (856.39 K) | ||
| نوع مقاله: مقاله علمی- پژوهشی | ||
| شناسه دیجیتال (DOI): 10.22034/jpiut.2026.74476.4724 | ||
| نویسنده | ||
| مائوریسیو فرناندو بوزاتسکی* | ||
| گروه فلسفه، دانشگاه فدرال ماتو گروسو (UFMT)، کویابا، برزیل. | ||
| چکیده | ||
| This article asks what should count as agency in artificial systems. Contemporary discussions of artificial intelligence often move too quickly from goal-directed performance to stronger attributions of autonomy, intelligence, or human-like agency. I argue that a crucial distinction must be drawn between pursuing goals within a given framework, responding to considerations as reasons, and participating in the constitution and revision of the normative environments in which reasons and goals acquire significance. The argument begins with Thomas Nagel’s distinction between functional equivalence and subjective experience and develops through Don Ihde’s account of technological mediation. The historical cases of William Herschel’s detection of infrared radiation and Paul Langevin’s development of ultrasonic detection show how technologies can transform human perceptual relations without eliminating phenomenological difference. The analysis then turns to The Isle, a multiplayer survival game in which human players act through computationally constrained non-human bodies. The game makes visible a distinction between computationally specified conditions of action and reasons generated through social interaction. Finally, drawing on recent debates on artificial agency, including Luciano Floridi, Leonard Dung, Federico Faroldi, and Mandy Zafar, I distinguish goal-directed agency, reasons-responsive agency, and normatively transformative agency. Artificial agency may be genuine without reproducing human consciousness or intelligence. A further and distinct philosophical question arises, however, if artificial agents become capable not merely of pursuing objectives or responding to reasons, but of participating in transformations of the normative space within which objectives become meaningful. | ||
| کلیدواژه‌ها | ||
| Artificial Agency؛ Reasons؛ Normativity؛ Artificial Intelligence؛ Technological Mediation؛ Postphenomenology | ||
| مراجع | ||
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Afterthought LLC. (2015). The Isle [Video game]. Afterthought LLC. Afterthought LLC. (2020a, September 26). EVRIMA patch 0.5.12.08. The Isle: Steam Community Announcements. Afterthought LLC. (2020b, December 19). EVRIMA patch 0.6.30.37. The Isle: Steam Community Announcements. Arenas-Dolz, F. (2017). Dimensiones de la virtualidad. Diálogo Filosófico, 97, 4–36. Barandiaran, X. E., Di Paolo, E., & Rohde, M. (2009). Defining agency: Individuality, normativity, asymmetry, and spatio-temporality in action. Adaptive Behavior, 17(5), 367–386. Duck, F. (2022). Paul Langevin, U-boats, and ultrasonics. Physics Today, 75(11), 42–48. Dung, L. (2025). Understanding artificial agency. The Philosophical Quarterly, 75(2), 450–472. Faroldi, F. L. G. (2026). Reasons-based artificial agents. AI and Ethics, 6, Article 77. Floridi, L. (2025). AI as agency without intelligence: On artificial intelligence as a new form of artificial agency and the multiple realisability of agency thesis. Philosophy & Technology, 38, Article 30. Floridi, L., & Sanders, J. W. (2004). On the morality of artificial agents. Minds and Machines, 14(3), 349–379. Ihde, D. (1990). Technology and the lifeworld: From garden to earth. Indiana University Press. McDowell, J. (1994). Mind and world. Harvard University Press. Minkina, W. (2021). How infrared radiation was discovered—Range of this discovery and detailed, unknown information. Applied Sciences, 11(21), Article 9824. Nagel, T. (1974). What is it like to be a bat? The Philosophical Review, 83(4), 435–450. Sellars, W. (1997). Empiricism and the philosophy of mind. Harvard University Press. (Original work published 1956) van Lier, M. (2023). Introducing a four-fold way to conceptualize artificial agency. Synthese, 201, Article 85. Zafar, M. (2025). Normativity and AI moral agency. AI and Ethics, 5, 2605–2622. | ||
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آمار تعداد مشاهده مقاله: 137 تعداد دریافت فایل اصل مقاله: 59 |
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