- Arslan, M. O. (2017). Linking agent-based computational economics to post keynesian economics. Uluslararası Yönetim İktisat ve İşletme Dergisi, 13(1), 1-17.
- Allingham, M. G., & Sandmo, A. (1972). Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis Journal of Public Economics, 1: 323. 338.
- Garcia Alvarado, F. (2019). Network-based policies versus tax evasion. In Network theory and agent-based modeling in economics and finance (pp. 405-428). Springer, Singapore.
- Andrei, A. L., Comer, K., & Koehler, M. (2014). An agent-based model of network effects on tax compliance and evasion. Journal of Economic Psychology, 40, 119-133.
- Arslan, M. O., & İcan, Ö. (2013). An Agent-Based Analysis of Tax Compliance for Turkey. Anadolu University Journal of Social Sciences, 13(2).
- Becker, G. S. (1968). Crime and punishment: An economic approach. In The economic dimensions of crime (pp. 13-68). Palgrave Macmillan, London.
- Bell, D. E. (1985). Disappointment in decision making under uncertainty. Operations research, 33(1), 1-27.
- Berger, W., Hokamp, S., & Seibold, G. (2021). Dynamic behavioural changes in an agent-based econophysics tax compliance model: bomb crater versus target effects and efficient audit strategies. Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice, 36(1), 3-24.
- Bertotti, M. L., & Modanese, G. (2014). Micro to macro models for income distribution in the absence and in the presence of tax evasion. Applied Mathematics and Computation, 244, 836-846.
- Bloomquist, K. M. (2008). Taxpayer compliance simulation: A multi-agent based approach. In Social simulation: Technologies, advances and new discoveries (pp. 13-25). IGI Global.
- Cowell, F. A., & Gordon, J. P. (1988). Unwillingness to pay: Tax evasion and public good provision. Journal of Public Economics, 36(3), 305-321.
- Fortin, B., Lacroix, G., & Villeval, M. C. (2007). Tax evasion and social interactions. Journal of Public Economics, 91(11-12), 2089-2112.
- Gordon, J. P. (1989). Individual morality and reputation costs as deterrents to tax evasion. European economic review, 33(4), 797-805.
- Górecki, M. A., & Letki, N. (2021). Social norms moderate the effect of tax system on tax evasion: Evidence from a large-scale survey experiment. Journal of Business Ethics, 172(4), 727-746.
- Hashimzade, N., Myles, G. D., Page, F., & Rablen, M. D. (2014). Social networks and occupational choice: The endogenous formation of attitudes and beliefs about tax compliance. Journal of Economic Psychology, 40, 134-146.
- Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). On the interpretation of intuitive probability: A reply to Jonathan Cohen.
- Kim, Y. (2003). Income distribution and equilibrium multiplicity in a stigma-based model of tax evasion. Journal of Public Economics, 87(7-8), 1591-1616.
- Loomes, G., & Sugden, R. (1987). Testing for regret and disappointment in choice under uncertainty. The Economic Journal, 97, 118-129.
- Myles, G. D., & Naylor, R. A. (1996). A model of tax evasion with group conformity and social customs. European Journal of Political Economy, 12(1), 49-66.
- Neugart, M., & Richiardi, M. (2012). Agent-based models of the labor market. LABORatorio R. Revelli working papers series, 125.
- Pestieau, P., & Possen, U. M. (1991). Tax evasion and occupational choice. Journal of Public Economics, 45(1), 107-125.
- Pickhardt, M., & Prinz, A. (2014). Behavioral dynamics of tax evasion–A survey. Journal of Economic Psychology, 40, 1-19.
- Quiggin, J. (1981). Risk perception and the analysis of risk attitudes. Australian Journal of Agricultural Economics, 25(2), 160-169.
- Simon, H. A., Eatwell, J., Milgate, M., & Newman, P. (1990). Bounded rationality. Utility and probability.
- Snow, A., & Warren, R. S. (2005). Ambiguity about audit probability, tax compliance, and taxpayer welfare. Economic Inquiry, 43(4), 865-871.
- Sun, J., & Tesfatsion, L. (2007). Dynamic testing of wholesale power market designs: An open-source agent-based framework. Computational Economics, 30(3), 291-327.
- Tesfatsion, L., & Judd, K. L. (Eds.). (2006). Handbook of computational economics: agent-based computational economics. Elsevier.
- Torgler, B., Schneider, F., & Schaltegger, C. A. (2010). Local autonomy, tax morale, and the shadow economy. Public Choice, 144(1), 293-321.
- Wakker, P. P. (2008). Explaining the characteristics of the power (CRRA) utility family. Health economics, 17(12), 1329-1344.
- Yitzhaki, S. (1974). A Note on Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Approach. Journal of Public Economics, 3(2), 2011-202
|
